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Case Notes and Statute Notes
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT-AIRLINE EXIT REGULATION-
The Power of the Civil Aeronautics Board under the Airline De-
regulation Act Includes the Power to Order an Incumbent Airline
to Provide Back-up Service for a Replacement Carrier in order to
Insure Essential Air Transportation Service to the Affected City
on a Continuing Basis. Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 621 F.2d
369 (10th Cir. 1980).
Frontier Airlines held a certificate of public convenience and
necessity authorizing air transportation to Alamogordo and Silver
City, New Mexico.! On March 23, 1979, Frontier filed a ninety-day
notice of its intent to terminate service to the two cities.! Pursuant
to the Federal Aviation Act,3 the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB
or Board) ordered Frontier to continue serving both Alamorgordo
and Silver City for periods of thirty days each until replacement
service could be found.' Zia Airlines, a small commuter airline,
1 Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 621 F.2d 369, 370 (10th Cir. 1980). A
certificate of public convenience and necessity is issued by the CAB and gives
the airline permission to engage in air transportation. 49 U.S.C. § 1371(a)
(Supp. II 1978).
2Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 621 F.2d 369, 370 (10th Cir. 1980). The
Federal Aviation Act provides that a carrier holding a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity cannot terminate or suspend all air transportation that
it is providing unless the carrier has first given the CAB, any community affected,
and the state agency of the state in which the community is located at least 90
days notice of its intent to terminate or suspend service. 49 U.S.C. § 1371(j)
(Supp. II 1978). See also 49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(3) (A) (i) (Supp. IH 1978).
349 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1976 and Supp. 11 1978).
" Section 419(a)(6) of the Federal Aviation Act states:
Notwithstanding section 401(j) of this title, if an air carrier has
provided notice to the Board under paragraph (3) of such air
carrier's intention to suspend, terminate, or reduce service to any
eligible point below the level of essential air transportatin to such
point, and if at the conclusion of the applicable period of notice
the Board has not been able to find another air carrier to provide
essential air transportation to such point, the Board shall require
the carrier which provided such notice to continue such service to
such point for an additional 30-day period, or until another air
carrier has begun to provide essential air transportation to such
point, whichever first occurs. If at the end of such 30-day period
the Board determines that no other air carrier can be secured to
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offered to provide replacement service to these cities. The CAB
ordered Frontier to suspend all of its air service to Alamogordo
and Silver City' subject to two conditions. First, Frontier was to
continue its service to these cities until Zia had inaugurated service,
at a minimum, at the appropriate levels of "essential air transporta-
tion."' Secondly, once the appropriate levels of "essential air trans-
portation" service were begun by Zia, Frontier was to remain avail-
able for a thirty day period as a back-up carrier to insure that "es-
sential air transportation" service would be provided.! The CAB is-
sued further orders that defined Frontier's back-up obligation' and
provide essential air transportation to such eligible point on a con-
tinuing basis, either with or without compensation, then the Board
shall extend such requirement for such additional 30-day periods
(making the same determination at the end of each such period)
as may be necessary to continue air transportation to such eligible
point until an air carrier can be secured to provide essential air
transportation to such eligible point on a continuing basis.
49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(6) (Supp. II 1978).
5 Notice of Intent of Frontier Airlines, CAB Order No. 79-6-193 (June 28,
1979).
'See § 419(f) of the Federal Aviation Act for a definition of essential
air transportation, 49 U.S.C. § 1389(f) (Supp. II 1978). See notes 35 & 36 infra,
and accompanying text.
Notice of Intent of Frontier Airlines, CAB Order No. 79-6-193 (June 28,
1979). The Board's order states that "after Zia inaugurates an essential level of
air transportation at Alamogordo and Silver City, we will require that Frontier
be available for an additional 30-day period to insure that essential service is
provided to these communities if, for any reason, Zia does not provide such
service." Id. at 10.
8 Notice of Intent of Frontier Airlines, CAB Order 79-8-57 (August 9, 1979).
The order states:
How Frontier determines to insure the provision of essential air
service during this period is a management decision. Possible op-
tions for Frontier include a plan of financial or fuel support for
Zia if needed during the transition period or a contingent arrange-
ment with a third fit and reliable carrier to provide service through
a wet-lease or other devices. If we find that problems are develop-
ing with Zia's start-up of replacement services, we will work with
Zia, Frontier, and the communities to identify and resolve these
problems. If we determine that Frontier must step in to insure
essential service, we will again consult with the parties to deter-
mine how long is reasonable to give Frontier to fulfill its respon-
sibilities during the back-up period. It is unlikely, however, that
Frontier would, in any case, be given more than one week, and
we urge Frontier to make arrangements that would make possible
the insurance of essential service in a period somewhat short of
a week should Zia's performance not prove satisfactory. In addi-
tion Frontier could rely on a stand-by crew and aircraft from the
routine back-up capability we understand most airlines possess.
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required Frontier to back-up Zia for an additional sixty days.' At
the expiration of the additional sixty day period, the Board termin-
ated Frontier's back-up obligation. Frontier sought review in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit," claiming
Should Frontier not routinely maintain a system back-up capa-
bility, it is free to consider a dedicated stand-by capacity for 30
days.
Id. at 2-3. With regard to compensation the order states: "Of course, in our view
of any submissions by Frontier requesting compensation for losses, it is our
duty to consider whether its determinations balanced economic prudence with the
need to fulfill its responsibilities." Id. at 3.
'Notice of Intent of Frontier Airlines, CAB Order No. 79-10-171 (Oct. 29,
1979). The order extends Frontier's back-up requirement for an additional thirty
days. Id. at 2. Notice of Intent of Frontier Airlines, CAB Order No. 79-11-160
(Nov. 23, 1979). The order also extends Frontier's back-up responsibility stating:
Although Zia has continued to meet the operational standards for
its essential air service . . . . we are still concerned about several
potential administrative and operational problems. For these rea-
sons, we believe it is in the public interest to extend Frontier's re-
serve obligation for an additional 30 days. Notice of Intent of
Frontier Airlines, CAB Order No. 79-11-160 at 2 (Nov. 23, 1979).
Notice of Intent of Frontier Airlines, CAB Order No. 79-12-148 (Dec. 21,
1979). The order states:
We have continued to hold Frontier in a backup posture at these
two communities until we were confident that Zia could operate
reliable service and demonstrate that its corporate structure was
sound enough to be responsible for the provision of essential serv-
ice without the need of a backup carrier .... We are now confident
that Zia is in a position to operate without Frontier's reserve
obligation, which was not exercised, and therefore will take no
action to prevent Frontier's obligation from expiring on December
26, 1979.
Id. at 1.
"1 Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 621 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1980). The court's
jurisdiction to review these orders arises under 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1976)
(amended 1978). Venue in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit is provided under 49 U.S.C. § 1486(b) (1976) (amended 1978). Section
1006(e) of the Federal Aviation Act provides that no objection to any order
of the Board will be considered on judicial review unless the objection was
urged to the Board, "unless there was reasonable grounds for failure to do so."
49 U.S.C. S 1486(e) (1976) (amended 1978). The court in Frontier, however,
stated that:
The chronology of events before the Board constitutes . . . reason-
able grounds for not fully exploring before the Board the issue
raised by Frontier in this Court. The narrow issue here raised is
the authority of the Board to issue a back-up order. . . . We are
advised that similar back-up orders have been issued in numerous
other instances. In such circumstances it is very doubtful that the
Board would have vacated its back-up orders had a motion for
reconsideration been filed. . . . The general rule requiring ex-
haustion of remedies before an administrative agency is subject to
an exception where the question is solely one of statutory interpre-
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
that the CAB had no authority to issue orders requiring Frontier to
provide back-up service. Held: orders sustained: The power of the
Civil Aeronautics Board under the Airline Deregulation Act in-
cludes the power to order an incumbent airline to provide back-up
service for a replacement carrier in order to insure essential air
transportation service to the affected city on a continuing basis.
I. AIRLINE EXIT REGULATION
A. Federal Aviation Act of 1958
From 1938 to 1978 interstate air transportation was subject to
regulation by the federal government under the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 19382 and its successor, the Federal Aviation Act of
1958." Under this regulatory framework, an air carrier could not
lawfully engage in air transportation without a certificate of public
convenience and necessity from the CAB.1" The certificates specified
the routes on which the carrier could operate." An air carrier could
obtain permission from the CAB to terminate its service on one of
these routes only by filing an application to permanently abandon
the route" or by filing an application to amend its certificate of
public convenience and necessity." In either case the Board could
grant the application to terminate air service only after notice and a
hearing; and even then, the Board could grant the application only
if it found the action to be in the public interest.18 As a result, the
abandonment of a route was seldom permitted because, although
it might be in the airline's best interest, the carrier could rarely
tation. [We decline to dismiss the petition on any procedural basis,
and prefer to address the merits of the controversy.
Id. at 370-71.
12 Ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
Is Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 737 (1958).




18 1d. S 1371(j). The statute states:
No air carrier shall abandon any route, or part thereof, for which
a certificate has been issued by the Board, unless upon application
of such air carrier, after notice and hearing, the Board shall find
such abandonment to be in the public interest. . . . The Board
may, by regulation or otherwise, authorize such temporary suspen-
sion of service as may be in the public interest.
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show the abandonment to be in the public interest."0 The CAB
reduced the burden that these routes placed upon trunk carriers by
allowing a transfer of a route from a trunk carrier to local service
carriers," which were subsidized by the federal government when
necessary." Like terminations, no route authority could be trans-
ferred unless the Board found the move to be consistent with the
public interest." On many occasions a residual back-up obligation
was ordered by the Board in the route transfers between the cer-
tificated incumbent carriers and the commuter carriers willing to
provide replacement service. 3
B. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
The congressional purpose in passing the Airline Deregulation
19 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, AIR
TRANSPORTATION REGULATORY REFORM 13 (1978) [hereinafter cited as REGULA-
TORY REFORM). Most carriers served markets that were marginally profitable
but not as profitable as the routes that could have been chosen on solely eco-
nomic considerations. See Cohen, New Air Service and Deregulation: A Study in
Transition, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 695, 696 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Cohen].
See generally Comment, Route Exit Regulation Under The Airline Deregulation
Act: The Impact of Fuel Cost and Availability, 45 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1029,
1032-35 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
2 Cohen, supra note 19, at 696. Trunks are the major airlines, including
United, American, TWA, Continental, Braniff, Delta, Eastern, and National.
Local service carriers are airlines that were developed after World War II with
federal government assistance to provide service to smaller and more isolated
parts of the country on a regional scale. See generally G. EADS, THE LOCAL
SERVICE AIRLINE EXPERIMENT (1972) [hereinafter cited as EADS].
"t REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 19, at 13. The subsidies were granted so
that the carriers could offer air service to small communities that could not be
served by the certificated carriers on a profitable basis. Id. The subsidies were
based on the airline's systemwide operating costs and revenues. Id. See generally
EADS, supra note 20.
2249 U.S.C. § 1371(h) (1976) (amended 1978).
"In Application of Hughes Air Corp., CAB Order No. 77-1-133 (Jan. 24,
1977), the CAB allowed the airline to suspend service on the condition that
the incumbent carrier retain a residual obligation to reinstate service should
the commuter service fall below an acceptable minimum. Similarly, in Hawaiian
Airlines, Hana Suspension Case, CAB Order No. 73-8-67 (Aug. 13, 1973), the
CAB stated that suspension would terminate immediately if daily scheduled air
taxi service at Hana ceased to be provided on a regular basis and created an
obligation on the part of the incumbent carrier to reinstate its services. The
latter order was challenged in the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
on grounds unrelated to the imposition of the residual obligation and was
affirmed in Airlines Pilots Ass'n v. CAB, 514 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See
Application of Northeast Airlines, CAB Order No. 70-3-62 (Mar. 13, 1970)
(requiring the airline to reinstate service if at any time over the three year sus-
pension period the replacement carrier's service dropped below minimum
standards).
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Act" (ADA) was to move the air transportation industry away
from governmental regulation and into a competitive free market
climate.' The ADA was a legislative mandate to the CAB regard-
ing the direction of aviation, aviation policy, and the limits on
such policy." Congress emphasized that the deregulation of the
airline industry was to move in accordance with the ADA and not
pursuant to the perhaps differing views of some members of the
CAB.'Y
Although the thrust of the ADA is deregulation, section 419"'
allows the CAB to continue to have regulatory control over the
suspension, reduction, and termination of air transportation in small
communities." Under section 419' of the ADA, "essential air
transportation""1 is guaranteed for ten years to all points deemed
eligible. An eligible point is statutorily defined as any point in the
United States which a certificated air carrier was serving as of
October 24, 1978, or to which service was authorized but had been
suspended on that date.' Once the list of eligible points is estab-
lished, the Board is then required to determine the level of "essen-
24Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (amending 49 U.S.C. SS 1301-
1504 (1976)).
2H.R. REP. No. 95-1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1978); 44 Fed. Reg.
52,647 (1979). The Airline Deregulation Act calls for a gradual deregulation
of the airline industry over a ten year period. 49 U.S.C. 5 1389(g) (Supp. II
1978).
" H.R. REP. No. 95-1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1978).
27 Id.
28 49 U.S.C. 5 1389 (Supp. II 1978).
29 See Comment, "Deregulation"-Has it Finally Arrived? The Airline De-
regulation Act of 1978, 44 J. AIR L. & CoM. 799, 815-16 (1978). See also
44 Fed. Reg. 52,647 (1979), which states that the "Small Community Air Service
Program" addresses an area of the air transportation system where Congress
recognized a need for governmental involvement at points that cannot rely on
the marketplace to meet their needs. Id.
a"49 U.S.C. 5 1389 (Supp 11 1978).
31See note 35 infra, and accompanying text.
-49 U.S.C. §§ 1389(a), (g) (Supp. 11 1978).
3Id. at 5 1389 (a) (1). Eligible point also means certain points in Alaska and
Hawaii. 49 U.S.C. § 1389(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 11 1978). The Airline Deregulation
Act required the CAB to establish by January 1, 1980, the criteria for determin-
ing which of the points in Alaska and Hawaii should qualify as eligible points.
49 U.S.C. 5 1389(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 11 1978). See 14 C.F.R. 270, 44 Fed. Reg.
59,244, 59,245 (1979). On or after January 1, 1982, the Board, upon application
of any interested party, may designate eligible points in Alaska and Hawaii.
49 U.S.C. 5 1389(b)(2)(c) (Supp. 11 1978).
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tial air transportation" for such points." "Essential air transporta-
tion" is defined by the ADA as
scheduled air transportation of persons to a point provided under
criteria as the Board determines satisfies the needs of the commu-
nity concerned for air transportation to one or more communities
of interest and insures access to the nation's air transportation
system, at rates, fares, and charges which are not unjust, unrea-
sonable, unjustly discriminatory, unduly preferential, or unduly
prejudicial.'
The level of "essential air transportation" cannot be less than two
daily round trips, five days per week, or the level of service pro-
vided to the city during 1977.'
Certificated airlinese ' serving cities that are guaranteed "essential
air transportation" are statutorily required to give ninety days notice
to the Board, any community affected, and the appropriate state
agency before reducing the community's service below the "essential
air transportation" level.' Carriers that are not holding certificates
but which are receiving compensation must also notify the Board,
the appropriate state agency, and each community affected at least
ninety days prior to termination or suspension.' Airlines not hold-
ing certificates or receiving compensation must only provide the
Board, the community, and the appropriate state agency thirty days
notice prior to termination or suspension. 1
349 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1978).
3id. S 1389(f). The CAB's guidelines for the determination of essential
air transportation for eligible points focus on the number and designation of
hubs, specification of airports and equipment, frequency and times of flights,
maximum capacity guarantees, and the number of stops permitted. 14 C.F.R.
398, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,647, 52,659-60 (1979). See generally, Comment, supra
note 19, at 1032-42.
- 49 U.S.C. § 1389(f) (Supp. 11 1978). With respect to Alaska, "essential air
transportation" is to remain at a level no lower than that which existed during
1976, or two round trips per week, whichever is greater. Id. This is subject to
other agreements between the Board and the state agency in Alaska, after con-
sultation with the community affected.
87 Certificated airlines are those airlines holding certificates of public con-
venience and necessity. 49 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (Supp. II 1978). See note 1 supra.
3849 U.S.C. §§ 1371(j), 1389(a)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. II 1978).
39The CAB is empowered to subsidize service to an eligible point to insure
that "essential air transportation" will be provided. 49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(5)
(Supp. II 1978).
4 ld. § 1389(a)(3)(A)(ii).
"'Id. S 1389(a)(3)(B).
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When the Board receives notice of a change that would reduce
service below the required level of "essential air transportation," it
is required to make every effort to secure an air carrier to provide
at least "essential air transportation" to the eligible point on a
continuing basis." If at the end of the notice period the Board has
been unable to find another air carrier to provide "essential air
transportation," the Board is authorized under section 419 (a) (6) '
of the ADA to require the incumbent air carrier to continue its
service to the community." This service continuation order is effec-
tive for thirty days or until a replacement carrier begins to provide
"essential air transportation" service to the point.' If at the end
of the thirty day period the CAB has not found a replacement car-
rier, it is empowered to extend the requirement that the air carrier
continue service for such additional thirty day periods, making
the same determination at the end of each thirty day period as
may be necessary to preserve air service until a replacement carrier
can be found to provide "essential air transportation" to the eligible
point on a continuing basis.' Subsidized air carriers who are seek-
ing to terminate or suspend service continue to receive subsidy pay-
ments during the period in which they are forced to continue serv-
ice." Unsubsidized air carriers who are forced to continue service
are to be compensated for any losses that they incur as a result of
the Board's order."
C. Section 419(a)(6) of the ADA and The Back-up Order
The Board has interpreted section 419 (a) (6)' of the ADA as
authorizing the Board to issue back-up orders requiring the incum-
bent air carrier to remain at the eligible point until the Board
determines that the replacement carrier is able to provide "essential
air transportation" on a continuing basis." Thus, in Notice of
42 Id. S 1389(a) (9).
IId. S 1389(a) (6). See note 4 supra.
"49 U.S.C. 5 1389(a)(6) (Supp. 11 1978).
4 Id.
6 Id.
Ir d. S 1389(a)(7)(A).
"Id. 5 1389(a)(7)(B) and (C).
"Id. S 1389(a)(6). See note 4 supra.
50 See notes 51-58 infra, and accompanying text.
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United Airline?' the incumbent carrier was held responsible for
maintaining a back-up capability to resume service in case of
possible interruptions in "essential air transportation" service caused
by the replacement carrier's difficulties in arranging for future gate
and counter space.5" Similarly, in Notice of U.S. Air" the incumbent
airline was ordered to be available in a back-up capacity for a
thirty day period after termination of its service in order to insure
that the replacement carrier's completion of arrangements for facili-
ties, personnel, schedules, and subsidy rates would not have an
effect on the community's "essential air transportation." '
The Board has also exercised its authority to require back-up
service in situations where the replacement carrier has experienced
problems. In Notice of United Air Lines,' Air Pacific, the prospec-
tive replacement carrier, experienced serious operating problems
one day after inaugurating replacement service.' United Airlines,
the incumbent carrier, was required by the CAB to resume opera-
tions for a few weeks until the replacement carrier was again able
to establish "essential air transportation."'" In a similar situation,
Delta Airlines was required to resume operations at Presque Isle,
Maine for a brief period when Bar Harbor Airways, the replace-
ment carrier, proved unable to maintain "essential air transporta-
tion" service."
There is no language in the statute expressly stating that the
Board has the authority to issue a back-up order." Congress does
51 Notice of United Airlines, CAB Order No. 79-11-121 (Nov. 16, 1979).
52 Id. at 4.
-"Notice of U.S. Air, CAB Order No. 79-11-110 (Nov. 15, 1979).
"Id. at 4. Other back-up orders issued by the Board include: Notice of
United Air Lines, CAB Order No. 79-12-22 (Dec. 5, 1979); Notice of Air
Pacific, CAB Order No. 79-12-12 (Dec. 4, 1979); Notice of Ozark Airlines,
CAB Order No. 79-10-38 (Oct. 5, 1979); Notice of Peidmont Aviation, CAB
Order No. 79-9-81 (Sept. 27, 1979); Notice of Republic Airlines, CAB Order
No. 79-9-101 (Sept. 20, 1979); Notice of Delta Airlines, CAB Order No.
79-7-198 (July 30, 1979); Notice of United Air Lines, CAB Order No. 79-6-36
(June 5, 1979); Notice of United Air Lines, CAB Order No. 79-6-35 (June 5,
1979); Notice of Texas International Airlines, CAB Order No. 79-3-52 (Mar. 8,
1979); Notice of Hughes Airwest, CAB Order No. 79-2-101 (Feb. 15, 1979).
5 Notice of United Air Lines, CAB Order No. 79-7-44 (July 6, 1979); Notice
of United Air Lines, CAB Order No. 79-7-74 (July 12, 1979).
"I Notice of United Air Lines, CAB Order No. 79'-7-44 (July 6, 1979).
57 Id. at 2.
11 Notice of Delta Air Lines, CAB Order No. 79-10-56 (Oct. 10, 1979).
"See generally 49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(6) (Supp. II 1978). See note 4 supra.
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make it clear, however, that the Board's activities are to be cir-
cumscribed by the ADA regardless of the recent activities of the
Board." Further, the Board in its own guidelines adopted for
making "essential air transportation" determinations 1 states that
unnecessary operations of the incumbent carrier should be per-
mitted to cease so as to "enable the new carrier to develop its
operations."'
Support for the Board's contention that it possesses the power
to issue back-up orders arguably can be based in the Congressional
intent to insure a continuous system of scheduled "essential air
transportation" for small communities." The report of the Senate
Commerce Committee states that the ability of the replacement
carrier to provide "essential air transportation" service must be
confirmed by the Board before the incumbent carrier can withdraw
from the community." The report says that "[iln no case will such
an air carrier, who is operating on these 30-day periods, be allowed
to discontinue such air service until the Board certifies that another
air carrier is willing and able to step in and provide essential air
transportation to the point concerned." Representative McHugh,
author of the House version of the essential air service provision,"'
stated&' that small communities need to be assured "that there will
be no interruption in their essential air transportation, that is, they
will enjoy continuous air transportation during the transition
period."" This point was also made in a conversation !' between
Senator Cannon, co-author of the deregulation legislation," and
Senator Durkin:
66H.R. REP. No. 95-1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1978).
61 14 C.F.R. § 398, 44 Fed. Reg. 52,646, 52,648 (1979).
62 Id.
6349 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) (Supp. II 1978). The statute states that "[tlhe
maintenance of a comprehensive and convenient system of continuous scheduled
airline services for small communities and for isolated areas, with direct Fed-
eral assistance where appropriate" is in the public interest and in accordance
with the public convenience and necessity. Id.
64S. REP. No. 95-631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1978).
id.
66 124 CONG. REC. H 10319 (daily ed., Sept. 21, 1978).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 124 CONG. REC. S 5891 (daily ed., April 19, 1978).
70 124 CONG. REC. S 5890 (daily ed., April 19, 1978).
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Mr. Durkin: Is it correct to say that under section 401 and 419
of the Federal Aviation Act as amended by the bill, each and
every community now receiving certificated scheduled air trans-
portation service shall continue to have certified scheduled air
transportation without any break in service for a minimum of ten
years?
Mr. Canon: Yes it is correct."
I1. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AN AGENCY'S CONSTRUCTION
OF A STATUTE
Administrative agencies are entirely creatures of statute," and
the power of the agencies is circumscribed by the authority
granted." In CAB v. Delta Airlines' the Court held that the Board
was not allowed to amend Delta's certificate of public convenience
and necessity without a hearing that was required by statute."'
The Court in that case stated that "the determinative question is
not what the Board thinks it should do but what Congress has
said it can do.""
The statutory grant of a power to an agency, however, implies
that the agency has the power necessary for the enforcement of
the statute despite the absence of specific reference in the act to
the practice involved." The Supreme Court in American Trucking
Associations v. United States8 held that the Interstate Commerce
Commission had the authority to issue rules and regulations gov-
erning the use of leased equipment by authorized motor carriers,
even though there was no specific reference to leasing in the
71 124 CONG. REC. S 5891 (daily ed., April 19, 1978).
72Soriano v. United States, 494 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 1974); 3 SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 65.02 (4th ed. 1974).
7' Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944); Soriano v. United States,
494 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 1974); 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
65.02 (4th ed. 1974).
-4367 U.S. 316 (1961). See also SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978). The
Supreme Court found that the SEC had exceeded its statutory authority when
it issued a series of orders suspending trading in the securities of a corporation
for a longer period of time than its statutory authority mandated. Id. The court
was interpreting § 12(k) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
781(k) (1976). Id.
75CAB v. Delta Air Lines, 367 U.S. 316, 320 (1961).
" Id. at 322.
"American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 312 (1953)
78344 U.S. 298 (1953).
1981]
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statute."9 The Court found that the whole regulatory scheme of
the act was affected by leasing, and that the absence of the Com-
mission's power to promulgate rules concerning leasing endangered
enforcement of the entire regulatory scheme."
The construction of a statute by an agency charged with its ad-
ministration is entitled to substantial deference by the courts.8'
In Board of Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corp.' the Supreme
Court gave deference to the Federal Reserve Board's practice of
denying bank stock acquisitions by holding companies on the
grounds of financial and managerial deficiencies and denied a
corporation's proposed bank stock acquisition on similar grounds. 3
Along these lines, in United States v. Rutherford" the Supreme
Court disallowed a proposed exception to the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act" for terminally ill patients since the Federal
Food and Drug Administration had made no such exception in
the past." The rule of deference has been deemed especially appro-
priate in instances where the administrative practice is new and
involves a construction of a statute by the agency charged with
administering it.7 In Power Reactor Development Co. v. Elec-
tricians" the Supreme Court followed the Atomic Energy Com-
mission's interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act of 19549 re-
garding licensing of nuclear reactors because there had not been
7' Id. at 312. The statute involved was the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. 49
U.S.C. § 301-327 (1963).
"American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 312 (1953).
81 United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 546, 554 (1979); Board of Gover-
nors v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 251 (1978); Udall v. Tallman,
380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
82439 U.S. 234 (1978).
"Id. at 251.
"442 U.S. 546 (1979).
"21 U.S.C. S 355 (1972) (amended).
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 546, 555 (1979).
87 Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961); Nor-
wegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933) (stating that
the rule of deference is particularly appropriate where "the administrative practice
at stake involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged
with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts
work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new").
88 367 U.S. 396, 398 (1961).
8942 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976).
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a prior case on the issue brought under the act." Further, it has
been held that an agency's construction of a controlling statute
should be accepted by a reviewing court if such construction is
sufficiently reasonable,9' unless there are compelling indications
that the agency's interpretation is wrong."
Nevertheless, a line can be drawn between according adminis-
trative interpretations deference and allowing administrative
agencies to violate the law." In Federal Maritime Commission v.
Seatrim Lines" the Supreme Court, in ruling that the commission
had exceeded its statutory authority, stated:
The construction put on a statute by the agency charged with
administering it is entitled to deference by the courts, and ordi-
narily that construction will be affirmed if it has a reasonable basis
in law. . . . But the courts are the final authorities on issues of
statutory construction ... and are not obliged to stand aside and
rubber-stamp decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory
mandate or that frustrate the Congressional policy underlying a
statute."
Thus it has been held that the existence of a prior administrative
practice does not relieve the court of its responsibility of deter-
mining whether the practice is consistent with the agency's statu-
tory mandate."
III. FRONTIER AIRLINES, INC. V. CAB
A. The Court's Reasoning
In Frontier the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the
back-up orders challenged by Frontier' presented a question of
pure statutory construction of section 419(a) (6)" of the ADA."'
90 Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 398 (1961).
1 Train v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975).
92 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
"3Federal Maritime Comm. v. Seatrim Lines, 411 U.S. 726, 745 (1973);
Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 865 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 917 (1973).
94411 U.S. 726 (1973).
"Id. at 745-46.
"ISEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978); Arnold v. Morton, 529 F.2d 1101,
1104 (9th Cir. 1976).
" See notes 7-10 supra, and accompanying text.
s 49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(6) (Supp. 11 1978). See note 4 supra.
" Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 621 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1980).
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Examining the statute, the court noted the changes in the law
concerning air service to small communities brought about by
the ADA. ' The new ninety day notice provision under the ADA,' '
coupled with the Board's power to hold airlines for additional
thirty day periods,'" was held to evidence Congressional intent
that small communities have "essential air transportation" on a
continuing, uninterrupted basis.0
The court recognized that there was no specific language in the
statute authorizing back-up orders, but stated that the statute, by
necessary implication, permitted the Board to issue such orders.'"
The intent of Congress to guarantee small communities "essential
air transportation" service would be thwarted, the court reasoned,
if the incumbent carrier was allowed to leave and the replacement
carrier upon starting service was unable to maintain service at
the requisite "essential air transportation" level.' According to
the majority, such a result would prevent small communities from
having "essential air transportation" on a continuing basis "' and
would thus violate the statutory mandate."0 In reaching its deci-
sion, the court placed emphasis on the fact that the phrase "on a
continuing basis" appears twice in section 419(a)(6)'" of the
ADA."°
The court cited American Trucking Associations v. United
States"' for the proposition that the statutory grant of a greater
power implies a grant of a lesser power; that is, the power of the
Board to compel actual air service through its thirty day period
holding power carries with it the power to order back-up service. '
I' Id. The court discussed the changes in aviation law brought about by 49
U.S.C. S 1389 (Supp. 11 1978). See notes 4 & 32-48 supra.
1"149 U.S.C. S 1371(j) (Supp. 11 1978); 49 U.S.C. S 1389(a)(3)(A) (Supp.
II 1978). See note 38 supra, and accompanying text.
"49 U.S.C. S 1389(a)(6) (Supp. 11 1978). See notes 44-46 supra, and ac-
companying text.
'0I Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 621 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1980).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 372.
106 Id.
'" Id. at 371.
10049 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(6) (Supp. II 1978). See note 4 supra.
"'Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 621 F.2d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1980).
"'American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953).
".. Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 621 F.2d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1980). See
American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 312 (1953).
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The Board's reliance on the statute was given deference by the
court because the Board is charged with administering the statute.""
The Board's construction of the statute was ruled controlling as
it was sufficiently reasonable,"' was compatible with the language
of the statute, and was consistent with Congressional intent."'
B. Analysis of the Decision
The court is correct in its determination that Congress intended
small communities to have continuous "essential air transporta-
tion.''. Section 419(a) (6)1. of the ADA states that the Board
must find a replacement carrier that can provide "essential air
transportation" on a continuing basis, and the phrase "on a con-
tinuing basis" indicates that the statute is trying to emphasize the
continuity element of the "essential air transportation" require-
ment. The court is justified in deeming the "on a continuing basis"
phrase of the statute significant in its holding," ' because arguably
if Congress had intended that the incumbent carrier leave the
moment that the replacement carrier first establishes the requisite
level of "essential air transportation," Congress would have omitted
the "on a continuing basis" phrase from the statute.
Since the ADA is a legislative mandate to the Board to con-
form to the limits of the ADA legislation regardless of its previous
activities," it is unclear whether Congress intended that the Board
use back-up orders to insure air transportation. The statute says
nothing about back-up orders,"' nor does the statute require the
incumbent carrier to aid the replacement carrier, to supplement
112 Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 621 F.2d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1980). See
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553 (1979) (construction of statute
by agency charged with its administration is entitled to substantial deference by
courts). See Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961);
Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933).
113Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 621 F.2d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1980). See
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975)
(agency's construction of controlling statute should be accepted by reviewing
court if "sufficiently reasonable").
.. Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 621 F.2d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1980).
"' See notes 63-71 supra, and accompanying text.
11649 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(6) (Supp. II 1978). See note 4 supra.
117 Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 621 F.2d 372 (10th Cir. 1980).
"
8 See note 25 supra, and accompanying text.
'' See Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 621 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1980).
See generally 49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(6) (Supp. 11 1978). See note 4 supra.
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the replacement carrier's service so as to maintain the requisite
"essential air transportation" levels, to resume its own service if
the replacement carrier fails, or to maintain the capability to re-
sume service on short notice.' Yet the orders sustained in the
decision '2 suggest possible back-up duties for Frontier, perhaps
including fuel support for Zia' or the maintenance of a stand-by
crew and aircraft, " that are not based upon any statutory guide-
lines. The burden of keeping the replacement carrier reliable, there-
fore, seems to be shifted from the Board to the incumbent carrier.
The statutory burden is placed upon the Board to provide a re-
placement carrier that can provide "essential air transportation...
on a continuing basis";" the responsibility does not statutorily lie
with the incumbent carrier who wishes to depart."M Furthermore,
the Board's determination as to whether the replacement carrier
can provide "essential air transportation" on a continuing basis can
be interpreted as having to be made in advance of the replacement
carrier's inauguration of service, not after the service has begun,
as back-up orders would allow the Board to do. The report of the
Senate Commerce Committee noted that the incumbent carrier
cannot leave until the Board certifies that another carrier is "will-
ing and able to step in" and provide "essential air transporta-
tion."'' . Yet the words "step in" arguably indicate a desire by
Congress that the Board's determination of the capability of the
replacement carrier be made before the replacement carrier initi-
ates services, not after the replacement service has already begun."'
The court relies on American Trucking Associations v. United
States as authority for the Board's use of back-up orders. That
decision, however, is distinguishable from the present case. In
American Trucking, the whole regulatory scheme of the act would
have been endangered if the Interstate Commerce Commission's
120 Id.
"2 See notes 7-10 supra, and accompanying text.
122 See note 8 supra.
123 Id.
14 See text accompanying note 42 supra.
125 Id.
12 See text accompanying note 65 supra.
12 See generally id.
28 American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953).
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power to promulgate rules had not been allowed. " In the present
case, however, the capability of the replacement carrier to pro-
vide continuous "essential air transportation" service could be de-
termined before the replacement carrier begins service; hence
back-up orders may not be necessary for enforcement of the
statute.
The Board's interpretation of the statute is given deference by
the court,'" and such deference is appropriate because the adminis-
trative practice is new and involves a construction of the ADA by
the agency charged with administering it.13 ' Although the statute
does not mention back-up orders, the Board's interpretation does
not frustrate the congressional policy underlying the statute and,
arguably, does not violate the statutory mandate."' The Board's
approach, therefore, is probably a reasonable construction.131 Fur-
thermore, the congressional goal of insuring continuous "essential
air transportation" to small communities"' also makes it hard for
Frontier, in order to justify a reversal of the Board's statutory in-
terpretation, to present compelling indications that the statute is
wrong."
IV. CONCLUSION
Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB" will have a significant impact
on airlines who wish to withdraw from small communities guar-
anteed "essential air transportation.'... Airlines serving such com-
munities are, by this decision, placed in the position of being in-
surers of "essential air transportation" to these cities. Incumbent
airlines will have to develop plans to set aside finances or fuel to
help replacement carriers" or will have to make standby crews
and aircraft readily available to take over in case replacement
129 Id. at 312.
'3 Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 621 F.2d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1980).
131 See note 87 supra.
13See text accompanying note 95 supra.
"See note 91 supra.
1' See notes 63-71 supra.
'1
3 See note 92 supra.
"' Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 621 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1980).
137 See notes 32 & 33 supra, and accompanying text.
3See note 8 supra.
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carrier service is inadequate. '39
Under the procedure approved by the court, the CAB's burden
of finding a replacement carrier'"0 is lightened since the Board does
not have to accurately assess whether the replacement carrier can
provide service in advance of its inauguration of service. The ADA
is ambiguous as to the point in time at which the Board must assess
the replacement carrier's ability to provide "essential air trans-
portation" service. "' Thus, the Board can postpone its determi-
nation of the replacement carrier's ability to provide "essential air
transportation" service on a continuing basis until after the replace-
ment carrier's service has begun. The practical effect is that the
incumbent carrier becomes a safeguard upon which the CAB can
rely in instances where the Board erroneously allows an unfit car-
rier to initiate replacement service.
The court does not decide upon the length of time an incumbent
carrier can be required to be available to provide back-up service
in order to insure that the replacement carrier is providing "essen-
tial air transportation" on a continuing basis. The phrase "on a
continuing basis" is deemed significant by the court,' but is left
undefined. Thus it is likely that litigation will arise concerning the
length of time that an incumbent carrier has to remain in a com-
munity pursuant to back-up orders in order to insure that the "on
a continuing basis" requirement is met.
The court also states that it does not reach the question of
whether an incumbent carrier that is forced to remain is entitled
to a government subsidy for its lost revenues caused by the forced
inactivity. " The Board states that it will review Frontier's requests
for compensation for losses, but comments that in reviewing these
requests, it will weigh Frontier's economic prudence against Fron-
tier's need to fulfill its responsibilities. " Thus, the Board may re-
fuse to pay some or all of the losses incurred by an airline in carry-
ing out its back-up responsibility if the airline's prospective decision
139 Id.
140 See text accompanying note 41 supra.
141 Id.
" Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 621 F.2d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1980).
1 Id.
'"See note 8 supra.
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as to which type of back-up method to use"8 later turns out to be
classified as imprudent by the Board.
Viewed in light of the congressional intent of assuring that small
communities have continuous "essential air transportation" serv-
ice,"8 the court reaches a just result in Frontier Airlines, Inc. v.
CAB. The capability of replacement carriers has been shown to be
uncertain even after they have established the requisite levels of
"essential air transportation,' '. and back-up orders will provide a
measure of insurance in terms of the continuity of air transporta-
tion in cases where the replacement carriers' service is inadequate.
Back-up orders provide the Board with a practical means of in-
suring the continuity of "essential air transportation" as called for
by the "on a continuing basis" requirement of section 419 (a) (6)4
of the ADA. Thus, the court's decision should be followed.
Mark Spencer Biskamp
PRODUCTS LIABILITY-EXEMPLARY DAMAGES-Compli-
ance With Industry Custom Evidences "Slight Care" By the De-
fendant, Thereby Precluding Plaintiffs From Recovering Exemplary
Damages Under Texas Law. Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 623
F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980).
On November 21, 1974, Billy and Mary Maxey were en route
to Michigan when, outside of Comanche, Texas, their tractor/
trailer rig tipped over while rounding a curve. The right fuel tank
subsequently ruptured. After the truck came to a stop, the spilled
fuel ignited, killing the Maxeys.'
Billy Maxey's parents, individually and as next friends of the
decedents' surviving children, brought suit against the manufac-
turer/designer of the truck, Freightliner Corporation, in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.' Plaintiffs'
145 Id.
" See notes 63-71 supra, and accompanying text.
147 See notes 55-58 supra, and accompanying text.
14849 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(6) (Supp. II 1978). See note 4 supra.
1 Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 957 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
'Id. at 955.
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claim for relief included an action for strict liability in tort based
on the ground that the design of the fuel system was unreason-
ably dangerous.3 The fuel system allegedly was unreasonably dan-
gerous because (1) it was not reasonably crashworthy, (2) Freight-
liner had failed to warn users of the product of this danger, and
(3) Freightliner's conduct regarding the design testing was inade-
quate. Plaintiffs further alleged that the sale of trucks with this fuel
system constituted gross indifference warranting imposition of ex-
emplary damages under Texas law.'
The case was tried and submitted to a jury which returned
verdicts for the Maxeys on the issues of design defect5 and gross
indifference.' The jury, however, found for Freightliner on two
issues: (1) that the fuel tank was not unreasonably dangerous
due to lack of adequate warnings,' and (2) that Billy Maxey
voluntarily assumed the risk of his injuries." The jury awarded
$150,000 in actual damages and $10,000,000 in exemplary dam-
ages on behalf of the Maxeys' children,' but declined to return a
3 Id. at 957-58. To determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous,
it is necessary to weigh the risk of harm against the utility of the product, con-
sidering whether additional safety devices would unreasonably raise the cost or
diminish the utility of the product. See Helicoid Gage Div. of Am. Chain &
Cable Co. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A product can be unreasonably dangerous due to a fail-
ure to warn of defects or due to a lack of safety devices. See Noel, Products
Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256 (1969).
Design defects are distinguished from defects in the product that result from
careless production or manufacture. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS S 96, at 944-45 (4th ed. 1971).
'450 F. Supp. at 958. See Bennett v. Howard, 141 Tex. 101, 170 S.W.2d
709 (1943). TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 26, provides: "Every person, corporation,
or company that may commit a homicide, through a willful act, or omission,
or gross neglect, shall be responsible, in exemplary damages, to the surviving
husband, widow, heirs of his or her body, or such of them as there may be,
without regard to any criminal proceeding that may or may not be had in rela-
tion to the homicide."




9 Id. at 957-59. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Maxey v. Freightliner
Corp., 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980), found it unusual that the jury in the
court below would find that plaintiff's decedent had assumed the risk of using
defendant's product, while at the same time awarding the plaintiffs exemplary
damages. Id. at 398.
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verdict for compensatory damages on behalf of the parents of Billy
Maxey."°
Upon defendant's motion, the trial court set aside the jury's ver-
dict for the exemplary damages.1 The court also rejected the
jury's determination that Billy Maxey had assumed the risk of
injury by his use of Freightliner's product." The court let stand,
however, the $150,000 verdict in favor of the Maxey's children for
actual damages. 3
Plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, seek-
ing review of the district court's ruling that set aside the jury's
verdict of gross indifference. Freightliner filed a cross appeal from
the judgment that awarded the surviving children actual damages.
Held, affirmed: compliance with industry custom evidences "slight
care" by the defendant, thereby precluding plaintiffs from recover-
ing exemplary damages under Texas law. Maxey v. Freightliner
Corp., 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES 4
Before 1962 a plaintiff in a products liability suit could only sue
a manufacturer/designer under the theories of negligence or breach
of warranty. Major difficulties arose with the negligence and
breach of warranty theories, however, which led to the adoption
of a rule of strict liability as an alternative cause of action in
products liability cases. In a negligence cause of action, a manu-
facturer/ designer may be held liable for negligence in the manu-
10 Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 958 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
11 Id. at 966.
12 ld. at 961.
13 Id. at 966.
1
4 The terms "exemplary" and punitive" are used interchangeably in de-
scribing the same type of award for damages. 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 236
(1965). See Riley, Punitive Damages: The Doctrine of Just Enrichment, 27
DRAKE L. REv. 195, 199 (1977-1978). Punitive damages originated in Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence with the English common law, see Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep.
768 (K.B. 1763), and in the United States they became established in the
Colonies. See T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 347
(1920).
'
5 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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facture' or design of its product." A manufacturer is under a
duty to use reasonable care to manufacture and design a product
that is reasonably safe for its intended use" and for other uses
that are reasonably foreseeable.' A major hurdle faced by a plain-
tiff under a negligence cause of action is proving that the defendant
manufacturer/designer was unreasonable in its design or manu-
facture of the product."0 Another problem that a plaintiff must
overcome under a negligence theory is proving causation; that is,
that the defendant's negligence caused the plaintiff's injury. 1 A
frequent defense in manufacturers' liability cases, particularly
where the manufacture of a component part is involved, is the
assertion that despite the manufacturer's original negligence the
injury was caused or aggravated by some intervening cause for
which the manufacturer may not be held liable.'
Apart from possible liability for its negligence, a manufacturer/
designer may be liable for injuries for a breach of warranty." The
warranty breached may be expressed or implied by law.' Express
16See North Am. Aviation v. Hughes, 247 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 914 (1958); Aerodex v. American Int'l Ins. Co.,
265 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1959); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co.,
224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956).
17 See Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir.
1955); Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 18 F.R.D. 169 (M.D. Pa. 1955); Noel,
Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design Instructions or Warnings,
19 Sw. L.J. 43 (1965); Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions
for Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962). See generally RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 398 (1934) ("A manufacturer of a chattel . . . is subject to liability
to others whom he would expect to use the chattel . . . for bodily harm caused
by his failure to use reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan or design.").
"See Smith v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 194 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Wolcho
v. Arthur J. Rosenbluth & Co., 81 Conn. 358, 71 A. 566 (1908).
19 See Shanklin v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 383 F.2d 819 (4th Cir. 1967);
Brown v. General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1036 (1967).
2See Gossett v. Chrysler Corp., 359 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1966); Brown
v. General Motors Corp., 355 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1966); Shanklin v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 254 F. Supp. 223 (S.D. W. Va. 1966), aff'd, 383 F.2d 819
(4th Cir. 1967).
2See Tibbits v. Crowell, 434 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1968, no writ); Schoonmaker v. Kaltenbach, 236 Wis. 138, 294 N.W. 794 (1940).
2RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 441(1) (1965) states: "An interven-
ing force is one which actively operates in producing harm to another, after the
actor's negligent act or omission has been committed."
2See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 650 (4th ed. 1971).
"See U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-315 (1952 version).
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warranties rest upon express representations to a purchaser of a
product.' Implied warranties include a general warranty of mer-
chantability, which "simply means that the thing sold is reason-
ably fit for the general purpose for which it is manufactured and
sold," '" and a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, which
means that the consumer is buying the product for a specific pur-
pose and relying on the seller's expertise. '
Plaintiffs suing under a breach of warranty theory have tradi-
tionally confronted two difficulties. The Uniform Commercial Code
prevents the buyer from recovering for a breach of warranty un-
less the buyer gives notice to the seller within a reasonable time
after he knows or should know of the breach. 8 A second problem
facing consumers is the seller's ability under the Code to disclaim
implied warranties. 9 Disclaimers thus permit a seller to reduce
substantially his liability under a warranty theory."
Difficulties with the negligence and breach of warranty theories
have led in some jurisdictions to a rule of "strict liability" as an
alternative cause of action in products liability cases. Section 402A
of the Second Restatement of Torts3' outlines the theory of strict
"See Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932). In-
cluded are affirmations contained in an advertisement designed to induce some-
one to buy a product. See Mannsz v. MacWhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3rd Cir.
1946); Topeka Mill & Elevator Co. v. Triplett, 168 Kan. 428, 213 P.2d 964
(1950); Crist v. Art Metal Works, 230 App. Div. 114, 243 N.Y.S. 496 (1930),
aff'd, 255 N.Y. 624, 175 N.E. 341 (1931).
26Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1961).
21 See 2 M. FRIEDMAN & L. FRUMER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.02 (1977). The
usual warranty involved in a products liability case is a warranty of merchant-
ability. Id. at § 16.04(2)(d).
-U.C.C. § 2-607(3) ("Where a tender has been accepted (a) the buyer
must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any
breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy .. ")
-Id. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a) ("[AII implied warranties are excluded by
. .. language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the
exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty .. ").
"Ild. See James, Products Liability, 34 TEX. L. REv. 44 (1955); Note, Sales-
Disclaimer of Implied Warranties Held Void as Against Public Policy, 109 U.
PA. L. REv. 453 (1961). Courts, however, have often looked unfavorably upon
disclaimers, finding them invalid. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 458, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1961). Disclaimers, how-
ever, have not been completely prohibited. See W. R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs
Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) outlines the require-
ments for strict tort liability:
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liability in tort. Section 402A requires that for the seller of a
product to be liable for strict liability in tort the seller must be
in the business of selling the product and the product must reach
the consumer without a substantial change in its condition." This
appears to be no different from requirements found in negligence
or breach of warranty theories. 3 Section 402A, however, allows
the consumer to recover despite the fact that the seller has exer-
cised all possible care and the consumer has not entered into a
contract with the seller." Strict liability in tort in a products lia-
bility cause of action is thus the easiest of the three theoriese to
prove as the plaintiff need only show that the product was defective
so as to be unreasonably dangerous. The plaintiff need not show
a specific fault on the part of the defendant in the manufacture
of the product, nor a breach of contract by the manufacturer.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.' was the first case to
employ the concept of strict liability in tort in a products liability
case. In that case, the plaintiff was injured by a defective power
tool. No negligence was shown in the maunfacture of the tool,
however, and therefore no negligence cause of action was possible."?
The defendant sought to avoid liability for breach of warranty on
1. One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property, if
a. The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
b. It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.
2. The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
a. The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
b. The user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relationship with the seller.
Id. The Texas Supreme Court adopted section 402A in McKisson v. Sales Affili-
ates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. 1967); See also D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: CASES AND MATERIALS (1976); Green, Strict Liability Under
Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1185 (1976);
Keeton, Products Liability-The Nature and Extent of Strict Liability, 1964
U. ILL. L. FORUM 693; Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057 (1967).
32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A (1965).
'See notes 16-30 supra, and accompanying text.
'4RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
" See note 31-34 supra, and accompanying text.
- 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
37 Id. at 58, 377 P.2d at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
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the ground that timely notice of the breach had not been given.'
Affirming the judgment against the manufacturer, the court ruled:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places
on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspeetion for
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human
being .... [T]he liability is not one governed by the law of con-
tract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort.'
THE TEXAS STANDARD IN ALLOWING EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
The Texas Constitution outlines the rule allowing for exemplary
damages in Texas:
Every person, corporation, or company, that may commit a
homicide, through wilful act, or omission, or gross neglect, shall
be responsible, in exemplary damages, to the surviving husband,
widow, heirs of his or her body, or such of them as there may be,
without regard to any criminal proceedings that may or may not
be had in relation to the homicide.40
Texas decisions permit recovery for punitive damages in a prod-
ucts liability case based on strict liability."' The Supreme Court of
Texas has stated "[i]n order that a recovery of exemplary dam-
ages may be sustained, the plaintiff must show ... that he [defend-
ant] acted intentionally or wilfully, or with a degree of (gross
negligence) which approximates a fixed purpose to bring about the
injury of which the plaintiff complains."' This test is still the basis
for allowing exemplary damages in Texas courts today.'
3I Id. at 59, 377 P.2d at 899, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 699. See note 28 supra.
3 59 Cal.2d at 60-61, 377 P.2d at 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699-700.
40 TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 26.
4'Krister v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973), was a
products liability case based on strict liability in which the court did not
allow exemplary damages because the elements of Article 15, § 26 of the Texas
Constitution were not present. Id. at 1091. The court indicated, however, that
punitive damages are allowed under the Texas Constitution. Id. at 1097. See
also Newding v. Kroger Co., 554 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1977, no writ); Hell Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
41 Bennett v. Howard, 141 Tex. 101, 107, 170 S.W.2d 709, 712 (1943).
' See note 4 supra. The Texas Constitution, art. 16, § 26, uses the term "gross
neglect." This term has been held to satisfy the term "gross negligence" by the
Texas Supreme Court. Sheffield Division, Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones, 376
S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964); Fort Worth Elevator Co. v. Russell, 123 Tex. 128,
70 S.W.2d 397 (1934).
19811
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Although the courts apply the same constitutional test, judicial
interpretations of the Texas Constitution have not been uniform.'
The basic issue generally has centered around the meaning of the
term "gross negligence." ' Texas Courts have struggled with this
term for nearly a century."'
One of the earliest cases in which the Supreme Court of Texas
defined "gross negligence" was Southern Cotton Press & Manu-
facturing Co. v. Bradley." In that case, plaintiff's decedent (his
wife) was crossing over a bridge when defendant's agents released
all the steam and boiling water contained in the boilers of de-
fendant's cotton press, scalding the decedent and causing injuries
from which she later died. Plaintiff sued for wrongful death and
sought exemplary damages. The court stated that for plaintiff to
recover punitive damages, defendant's conduct must constitute a
wilful act or omission or gross neglect. ' The court then held that
"gross negligence" meant such an "entire want of care which would
raise a presumption of conscious indiflerence to consequences. '"'
The court determined that plaintiff had not made such a case of
gross negligence as to entitle him to recover exemplary damages."
In 1895 the Supreme Court of Texas announced a broader
definition of "gross negligence" in International & Great Northern
Railway v. Cocke.5 The plaintiff sued for damages caused by the
killing and injury of plaintiffs' cattle by defendant's train. The
court defined "gross negligence" as "an entire failure to exercise
care, or by the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to justify
the belief that the person on whom care was incumbent was in-
44See notes 47-76 infra, and accompanying text.
'See, e.g., Siebenlist v. Hawille, 596 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. 1980); Annot., 98
A.L.R. 269 (1935). The Texas Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its
attempts to define "gross negligence" in this context. See International & Great
N. Ry. v. Cocke, 64 Tex. 151 (1885); Southern Cotton Press and Mfg. Co. v.
Bradley, 52 Tex. 587 (1880).
"See International & Great N. Ry. v. Cocke, 64 Tex. 151 (1885); Southern
Cotton Press & Mfg. Co. v. Bradley, 52 Tex. 587 (1880).
4152 Tex. 587 (1880).
48 Id. at 605, citing the Texas Constitution, art. XVI, S 26.
4 ' Id. (emphasis added). The Court went on to state that "such indifference
is morally criminal, and if it leads to actual injury may well be regarded as
criminal in law." Id.
50 1d. at 601. The court stated that defendant had been doing this for some
time and therefore was exercising some care. Id.
51 64 Tex. 151 (1885).
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different to the interest and welfare of others.'
Texas courts have never uniformly applied either the Bradley"'
or Cocke" definition of gross negligence. The courts have applied
the narrow definition requiring an "entire want of care"' in some
cases and the broader test of "slight care" in others," with little
or no explanation for their reliance on the particular test cited.
Some cases have even cited both tests with the implication that
they may be interchangable'
Initially, most courts applied the Bradley entire want of care
test" to determine the appropriateness of a punitive damages
award." Thus, in Robertson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co." plaintiffs
sought exemplary damages based on the defendant employer's
alleged gross negligence in failing to repair gas pipelines in the
building in which the decedent was working when he was killed.
The Beaumont Court of Civil Appeals stated that gross negligence
was that "entire want of care" that would raise a presumption of
conscious indifference to consequences."' Determining that there
was no evidence of gross negligence on the part of the defendant-
employer, the court emphasized the decedent's experience in per-
forming such work and concluded that he could have avoided the
52 Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
5s 52 Tex. 587 (1880).
"64 Tex. 151 (1885).
"See, e.g., Southern Cotton Press & Mfg. Co. v. Bradley, 52 Tex. 587
(1880); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Ford, 14 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1929, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Robertson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 255
S.W. 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1923, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
" See, e.g., International & Great N. Ry. v. Cocke, 64 Tex. 151 (1885);
Bruton v. Shinault, 314 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1958, no writ);
Fancher v. Caldwell, 309 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth), rev'd on
other grounds, 314 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1958).
" See Dallas City R.R. Co. v. Beerman, 74 Tex. 291 (1889); Goff v. Lub-
bock Bldg. Prods., 267 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1953, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (where the court stated that the language in the two definitions
meant "practically the same thing."); Sloan v. Leger Mill Co., 161 S.W.2d 333
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1942, ref'd w.o.m.).
5852 Tex. 587 (1880).
" See, e.g., Robertson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 255 S.W. 223 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1923, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
60 255 S.W. 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1923, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
61 Id. at 225, citing Southern Cotton Press and Mfg. Co. v. Bradley, 52 Tex.
587 (1880).
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accident.' The Bradley rule was also followed in Magnolia Petro-
leum Co. v. Ford,"3 in which plaintiffs sought exemplary damages
due to the alleged gross negligence of plaintiffs' decedent's em-
ployer in failing to inspect a "shaper machine" on which decedent
was working when killed. Relying on the entire want of care test
for gross negligence, the court stated that the "Supreme Court
recognized the necessity of affixing to the term a definite mean-
ing,"" thereby indicating its view that the Bradley rule was the
proper definition.
Subsequently, Texas courts continued to use the "entire want
of care" test, and the Supreme Court of Texas seemed to put the
issue of the definition for "gross negligence" to rest in 1943 in
Bennett v. Howard." In that case, the plaintiffs' decedent was
killed by an explosion in an oil well. Plaintiffs sued for exemplary
damages" on the ground that decedent's field superintendent was
guilty of gross negligence in not preventing the explosion." Citing
Bradley, the court stated that "[g]ross negligence, to be the ground
for exemplary damages, should be that entire want of care which
would raise the belief that the act or omission complained of was
the result of a conscious indifference to the right or welfare of
the person or persons to be affected by it.'"' The court went on
to state that the rule announced in the Bradley case had been
followed by the Texas Courts of Civil Appeals in other cases."
The court in Bennett then held that any test announced by Texas
courts for "gross negligence" other than the "entire want of care"
test was expressly overruled."
62 Id. at 230.
63 14 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1929, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
64 Id. at 99 (empasis added).
141 Tex. 101, 170 S.W.2d 709 (1943).
60 The issue of compensatory damages was not involved because decedent
was covered by workmen's compensation insurance. 170 S.W.2d at 712.
"I Id. at 709.
001d. at 712 (emphasis in the original).
'
9Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Robertson, 125 Tex. 4, 79 S.W.2d 830 (1935);
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Ford, 14 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1943,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rowan v. Allen, 134 Tex. 215, 134 S.W.2d 1022 (1940).
70 170 S.W.2d at 713. The court stated: "We adhere to the rule announced
in cases above mentioned, and any rule to the contrary announced in other
cases, in conflict therewith is hereby overruled." Id. citing Annot., 98 A.L.R.
267, 279 (1935) (stating that the "entire want of care" test is the test in Texas
for exemplary damages).
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Despite its rather forceful language, the Bennett case did not
end the debate by the Texas courts over defining gross negligence
as applied to exemplary damages. In Fancher v. CaldwelI' the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals cited the test for "gross negligence"
to be that used in International & Great Northern Railway v.
Cocke." The court in Fancher did not cite the Texas Supreme
Court's language in Bennett v. Howard,"' nor did it suggest a basis
for distinguishing that case.'4 Likewise, in Bruton v. Shinault,7' a
case in which plaintiff sued defendant for exemplary damages
based on defendant's gross negligence, the Waco Court of Civil
Appeals followed the definition of "gross negligence" cited in
Cocke and stated that "[ojur Supreme Court has not seen fit to
modify the foregoing rule.""6
One possible explanation for the diverse approaches taken by
the courts is the varying fact situations among the cases. One dis-
tinction which differentiates Bennett" from the line of cases fol-
lowing CockeM is that Bennett involved an employer-employee
situation in which the plaintiffs were alleging that the employer
was grossly negligent. A similar fact situation existed in Robertson
v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.," which also employed the narrow
"entire want of care" definition." The court in Bennett expressly
approved the decision in Robertson."
7' 309 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth), rev'd on other grounds, 314
S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1958).
7264 Tex. 151 (1885) ("An entire want of care, or by the exercise of so
slight a degree of care . . .").
11 14 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1943, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
T The court cited both the narrow Bradley definition and the broad Cocke
definition, but relied on the latter. 309 S.W.2d at 548.
75 314 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1958, no writ).
"Id. at 145. See also Fancher v. Caldwell, 309 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth), rev'd on other grounds, 314 S.W.2d 820 (1958).
"7 141 Tex. 101, 170 S.W.2d 709 (1943).
' 64 Tex. 151 (1885). See Bruton v. Shinault, 314 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1958, no writ); Fancher v. Caldwell, 309 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth), rev'd on other grounds, 314 S.W.2d 820 (1958).
" 255 S.W. 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1923, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see
note 67 supra.
80 255 S.W. at 225.
11 170 S.W.2d at 713. See note 70 supra.
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Fancher v. Caldwell" and Bruton v. Shinault," however, both
involved injuries resulting from automobile accidents. Neither of
those cases cited the Supreme Court's language in Bennett v. How-
ard." The court in Fancher cited both the narrow Bradley and the
broader Cocke definitions, but relied on the latter.' The court in
Bruton cited only the broader test for gross negligence."
The employment/non-employment distinction was implicitly fol-
lowed in the 1964 case of Sheffield Division, Armco Steel Corp.
v. Jones.8 ' In that case, plaintiffs were suing an employer of plain-
tiffs' decedent for exemplary damages. The Supreme Court of
Texas stated:
There is no question ... as to the rule of law applicable to cases
... where exemplary damages are sought. Gross negligence to be
the ground for exemplary damages should be that entire want of
care which would raise the belief that the act or omission com-
plained of was a conscious indifference to the right or welfare of
the persons affected by it.88
In 1975 the Texas Supreme Court decided Atlas Chemical In-
dustries, Inc. v. Anderson.8' There the court implicitly applied the
broader Cocke definition for gross negligence in a non-employment
factual setting. The court held that although the defendant had
exercised some care, plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages."
The case involved a suit for compensatory and exemplary damages
82 309 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth), rev'd on other grounds, 314
S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1950).
83 314 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1958, no writ).
84 141 Tex. 101, 170 S.W.2d 709 (1943).
85 309 S.W.2d at 548.
88 314 S.W.2d at 145.
87 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964).
88 Id. at 828 (emphasis in original). In Woolard v. Mobil Pipeline Co.,
479 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the
Texas standard to be the one set out in Bradley. The Fifth Circuit followed this
ruling in Ballenger v. Mobil Oil Corp., 488 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1974), which
involved an employment situation where plaintiffs sued for exemplary damages
based on the employer's alleged gross negligence. The court cited Sheffield Divi-
sion, Armco Steel v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964), in stating that the
narrow definition of gross negligence should be used. The court then stated that
"itihe exercise of even slight care defeats the presumption [of gross negligence]."
488 F.2d at 710.
" 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975).
10 Id. at 688-89.
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resulting from water pollution caused by industrial discharges from
the defendant's chemical plant. The case was reviewed by the
Supreme Court of Texas on the issue of what constituted the proper
standard of gross negligence." The court focused on the conduct
of the defendant between 1966 and 1969, a period during which
the defendant had reduced the amount of pollution by ninety-five
percent." The Texas Supreme Court initially set aside the award
of exemplary damages using the narrow Bradley test, noting some
efifort had been made by the defendant to reduce the pollution."
Shefield Division, Armco Steel v. Jones" was cited with approval
by the court. On rehearing, however, the Texas Supreme Court
departed from its prior holding and upheld the award of punitive
damages in a per curium opinion.' The court stated that the efforts
made by the defendant in Atlas, although evidencing some effort,
were not enough to preclude a finding of gross negligence by the
trier of fact."
The employment/non-employment distinction was not followed,
however, by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1977 in Hernan-
dez v. Smith." In Hernandez, plaintiffs8 sued an obstetrical clinic
for damages relating to the care of the wife. The wife was pregnant
and in labor when she arrived at the defendant hospital. Compli-
cations arose during delivery, resulting in the death of the child.
Plaintiffs sued for compensatory and exemplary damages." The
court stated that "[u]nder Texas law, there cannot be ...gross
negligence for purposes of exemplary damages if it is shown that
defendant exercised even slight care."1"
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals later held in Knabe v. Na-
tional Supply Division of Armco Steel'' that plaintiff was entitled
'Id. at 687-88.
o1 Id. at 688.
93Id.
"376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964).
9Id. at 688-89.
9Id.
97552 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1977).
The plaintiffs in this case were husband and wife.
552 F.2d at 144.
100 Id. at 145, citing Ballenger with approval. The court did not cite Atlas
Chemical Industries, Inc. v. Anderson, 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975), in deter-
mining which definition of gross negligence to use.
101 592 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1979).
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to recover punitive damages despite the fact that some efforts had
been made by defendant to correct the problems of which plain-
tiff complained.'" Knabe involved a situation where plaintiff dairy
farmers sought to recover damages for injury to their dairy busi-
ness as a result of water pollution caused by the defendant manu-
facturer. The district court set aside a jury award of fifty thousand
dollars in exemplary damages.'" The plaintiffs appealed, seeking
reinstatement of the exemplary damages. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, citing Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc. v. Anderson,'"
stated that although evidence showed that the defendant had made
some efforts to correct the problem, those efforts were not enough
to prevent the defendant from being held grossly negligent.'"
THE EFFECT OF INDUSTRY CUSTOM
In negligence and gross negligence cases involving a defendant's
standard of care, courts often look to the custom of the industry
in determining liability.'" Evidence of the usual and customary
conduct of other companies in a specific industry is normally rele-
vant and admissible as to what the community regards as proper.
If the defendant complies with industry custom there is an infer-
ence that he is acting reasonably, thus providing less basis for
finding him grossly negligent."' Evidence of industry custom is not
entirely conclusive as to the existence of negligence, however, and
an entire industry's conduct may be found to be improper. 0'
I Id.
03 d. at 843.
1O4 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975).
'05 592 F.2d at 845, 846.
'0" Cadillac Motor Co. v. Johnson, 221 F. 801 (2nd Cir. 1915); Murphy v.
American Barge Line, 76 F. Supp. 276 (W.D. Pa. 1958); Honea v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272, 183 S.W.2d 968 (1944).
" Honea v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272, 183 S.W.2d 968 (1944).
101 In W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 33, at 167 (4th ed.
1971), it is stated:
Even an entire industry, by adopting such careless methods to
save time, effort, and money, cannot be permitted to set its own
uncontrolled standard .... If the only test is to be what had been
done before, no industry, or group will ever have any great incen-
tive to make progress in the direction of safety.
See Marietta v. Cliff Ridge, Inc., 20 Mich. App. 449, 174 N.W.2d 164 (1970);
Tite v. Omaha Colliseum Corp., 144 Neb. 22, 12 N.W.2d 90 (1943); Shafer v.
H. B. Thomas Co., 53 N.J. Super. 19, 146 A.2d 483 (1958); Maize v. Atlantic
Ref. Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945).
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One rationale advanced in holding that compliance with indus-
try custom is not a complete defense to exemplary damages is that
it would not provide an incentive for the members of the industry
to improve their products."0 The purpose of exemplary damages
is to defer defendant and others similarly situated from engaging
in such wrongful conduct in the future." ' The cases that have
followed this reasoning have held that such a limitation on liability
would frustrate the entire concept of punishment and deterrence."'
Perhaps the most celebrated case on industry custom has been
The T. J. Hooper."2 In The T. J. Hooper two tugs that were tow-
ing barges were lost in a gale off the New Jersey coast. The tugs
did not have radio receiving sets and hence did not have an up-
to-date weather report. The court held that the general practice
of an industry is not necessarily the reasonable practice, and more
may be required than that generally done by the industry. ' Specifi-
cally, the court stated:
Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common pru-
dence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have
unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices. It
never may set its own tests, however persuasive its usages. Courts
must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so im-
'See Ft. Worth Elevators v. Russell, 123 Tex. 128, 70 S.W.2d 397 (1934);
Cole v. Tucker, 6 Tex. 265 (1881); Courtesy Pontiac, Inc. v. Ragsdale, 532
S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (purpose of exemplary
damages is not to compensate plaintiff, but to punish); Credit Plan Corp. of
Houston v. Gentry, 516 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.),
rev'd on other grounds, 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1974) (purpose of awarding
exemplary damages is to set an example that will deter defendant and others
similarly situated from engaging in such wrongful conduct in the future); J. S.
Abercrombie Co. v. Scott, 267 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1954,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
lO Credit Plan Corp. of Houston v. Gentry, 516 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Houston [14th Dist.]), rev'd on other grounds, 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1974).
"ISee Ft. Worth Elevators v. Russell, 123 Tex. 128, 70 S.W.2d 397 (1934);
Cole v. Tucker, 6 Tex. 265 (1881); Courtesy Pontiac, Inc. v. Ragsdale, 532
S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (purpose of exemplary
damages is not to compensate plaintiff, but to punish); Credit Plan Corp. of
Houston v. Gentry, 516 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]),
rev'd on other grounds, 528 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1974) (purpose of awarding ex-
emplary damages is to set an example which will deter defendant and others
similarly situated from engaging in such wrongful conduct in the future); J. S.
Abercrombie Co. v. Scott, 267 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1954,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1'2 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
I' Id. at 740.
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perative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their
omission."'
In Texas, courts have similarly recognized that industry custom
does not totally insulate a defendant from a finding of negligence.
In Turner v. General Motors Corp."1 the Houston Court of Civil
Appeals held that the industry custom may be an improper one.
There the plaintiff suffered injuries when the roof of his car col-
lapsed during a rollover. The plaintiff sued the automobile manu-
facturer and automobile dealer under a theory of strict liability in
tort.116 An expert witness testified that the defendant, General
Motors Corporation, was complying with industry custom in the
design and manufacture of the roofs of its cars."' The court stated
that although the defendant had complied with the industry custom
in its structure and design of automobile roofs, the custom itself
may be shown to be improper.1"
THE MAXEY CASE
Relying on the Texas Constitution's express authorization of
punitive damages in instances of wrongful death caused by gross
neglect, the federal district court in Maxey v. Freightliner Corp."'
held that exemplary damages are proper in a products liability
cause of action based on strict liability in tort, despite Freightliner's
contention that the doctrine of strict liability and the remedy of
exemplary damages are incompatible. In determining the Texas
standard of exemplary damages, the district court in Maxey re-
lied on Sheffield Division, Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones,"0 which
held that "gross negligence" was an entire want of care that would
raise a presumption of conscious indifference to the consequences."
Discussing the issue of industry custom and its effect on the de-
fendant's liability, the district court in Maxey noted that the de-
11 Id. (emphasis added).
1- 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
'
16 d. at 499. Plaintiff alleged that the automobile was not crashworthy and
that this enhanced his injuries. Id.1 1 d. at 506.
1,Id.
119 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
120 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964). See note 87 supra, and accompanying text.
11 376 S.W.2d at 828.
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sign of the truck tanks was common to the trucking industry."'
The court stated that although industry standards may not provide
an absolute defense to a strict liability claim for exemplary dam-
ages, the "critical circumstance" in its determination was its con-
cern that the court would have to hold the entire trucking industry
in the United States grossly negligent." This, the court stated, it
was not prepared to do. It held that by adopting a design common
to all manufacturers, the defendant exercised "slight care," which
precluded the court from finding the defendant grossly negligent."'
Thus the district court adopted the narrow definition of gross
negligence"' in determining whether the plaintiffs were entitled to
recover exemplary damages."
In a very brief analysis, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Maxey upheld the district court's adoption of the narrow definition
of gross negligence as applied to exemplary damages. 2 ' The Court
cited Sheffield Division, Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones". and Hernan-
dez v. Smith,"' stating: "Under Texas law, there cannot be . ..
gross negligence for purpose of exemplary damages if it is shown
that the defendant exercised even slight care.""' The Fifth Circuit
summarily affirmed the district court's holding that the defendant,
by adopting the custom of the industry, had made such an effort
as to preclude liability for exemplary damages, using the narrow
definition of gross negligence."'
The dissenting opinion stated that the district court and the
majority of the Fifth Circuit were incorrect in their determination
of the Texas standard of "gross negligence" for exemplary dam-
122 450 F. Supp. at 963.
23 Id. at 964.
124Id.
"'Southern Cotton Press & Mfg. Co. v. Bradley, 52 Tex. 587 (1880).
"'450 F. Supp. at 964.
127 In discussing the gross negligence definition, neither the district court
nor the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals cited any cases that applied the broader
definition of gross negligence found in Cocke for exemplary damages.
"' 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964). The court also cited Woolard v. Mobil Pipe-
land Co., 479 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973).
"'552 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1977).
"Id. at 145.
1 Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 623 F.2d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 1980).
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ages. 3' Relying on Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc. v. Anderson'3
and Knabe v. National Supply Division of Armco Steel Corp., 4
the dissent said that a defendant is liable for exemplary damages
if it fails to exercise any care or so slight a degree of care that the
fact finder could conclude that the defendant was consciously in-
different to the right or welfare of others.'" Continuing, the dis-
sent criticized the majority and Hernandez v. Smith"' for ignoring
Atlas Chemical. According to the dissent, the court in Hernandez
relied on cases that were decided before Atlas and that used the
narrow definition of gross negligence regarding exemplary dam-
ages.' The dissent further stated that allowing industry custom
as a defense would result in "bad policy.' ' . It was felt by the dis-
sent that a manufacturer would not have an incentive to advance
technologically in order to avoid exemplary damages so long as it
was following industry custom. This would, according to the dis-
sent, defeat the purposes of punitive damages, which are to punish
and deter future activity.' 9
MAXEY AND THE FUTURE
Two basic definitions have been advanced in different cases
throughout the history of the "gross negligence" issue.' These
definitions on occasion have been applied by some courts as if
112 Id. at 400 (Johnson, J. dissenting).
' 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975). The Texas Supreme Court initially held
that plaintiff was not entitled to exemplary damages because defendant had made
some effort. Upon rehearing, however, the court held plaintiff was entitled to
exemplary damages and noted that at some point the defendants' failure to do
more would warrant an award of exemplary damages. Id.
592 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1979). The court noted that the defendant, like
the defendant in Atlas Chemical, had made some effort to correct the problem
but that this did not preclude a recovery of exemplary damages by plaintiff. Id.
at 845.
'- 623 F.2d 395, 402 (1980) (Johnson, J. dissenting). This is basically the
same test used in International & Great Northern Railway v. Cocke, 64 Tex. 151
(1885).
" 552 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1977).
31 623 F.2d at 402. See Ballinger v. Mobil Oil Corp., 488 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974).
138 623 F.2d at 405.
"' See notes 109-11 supra.
'
40 See International & Great N. Ry. v. Cocke, 64 Tex. 151 (1885); Southern
Cotton Press & Mfg. Co. v. Bradley, 52 Tex. 587 (1880).
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they were synonymous and could be used interchangeably."' The
Bradley definition requires a complete absence of care," while
the Cocke definition allows a plaintiff to recover exemplary dam-
ages even though the defendant exercises some care.'"
One distinction implicit in the prior Texas decisions has been
the employment/non-employment distinction.'" In cases involving
an employer-employee relationship, the courts have generally used
the narrow Bradley definition of gross negligence in determining
if a plaintiff is entitled to exemplary damages.' In cases that do
not arise from an employer-employee relationship, on the other
hand, the courts have tended to use the broader definition of
gross negligence regarding the awarding of exemplary damages.'
The employment/non-employment distinction seems to be with-
out logic since employees arguably are placed in as great or
greater danger than individuals in non-employment situations.
Thus, employees are deserving recipients of exemplary damages.
Good examples of the dangerous situations that employees face are
found in Bennett v. Howard ' and Sheffield Division, Armco Steel
Corp. v. Jones.' In Bennett the employee was killed by a gas
pressure explosion that occurred while he was working on an oil
well.'' In Sheffield the employee died from bums received in a
gas explosion that occurred while he was working in a gas purify-
ing machine in the defendant-employer's steel mill."' These types
'See note 55 supra.
'"Southern Cotton Press and Mfg. Co. v. Bradley, 52 Tex. 587, 600 (1880).
'"International & Great N. Ry. v. Cocke, 64 Tex. 151, 156 (1885).
'4" See notes 77-90 supra, and accompanying text.
'"See Ballenger v. Mobil Oil Corp., 488 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1974); Woolard
v. Mobil Pipe Line Co., 479 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973); Sheffield Div., Armco
Steel Corp. v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964); Bennett v. Howard, 141 Tex.
101, 170 S.W.2d 709 (1943); Robertson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 255 S.W.2d
223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1925, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
'"See Knabe v. National Supply Div. of Armco Steel Corp., 592 F.2d
841 (5th Cir. 1979); Atlas Chemical Indus., Inc. v. Anderson, 524 S.W.2d 681
(Tex. 1975); Bruton v. Shinault, 314 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1958,
no writ); Fancher v. Caldwell, 309 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth),
rev'd on other grounds, 314 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1958).
141' 141 Tex. 101, 170 S.W.2d 709 (1943).
148 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964).
49Bennett v. Howard, 141 Tex. 101, 170 S.W.2d 709 (1943).
1'0 Sheffield Div., Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex.
1964).
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of cases seem to indicate that the employer owes a greater duty
to care to an employee than to an individual in a non-employment
situation. Such a situation arguably requires using the broader
Cocke definition for gross negligence, which allows the trier of
fact to find gross negligence even if slight care is exercised by the
defendant.' The courts, however, continue to use the narrow
Bradley definition for gross negligence in employer-employee situa-
tions and thereby preclude recovery of exemplary damages.
If this is the distinction the courts are trying to draw, the court
in Maxey should have used the broader definition of gross negli-
gence as the case did not involve an employer-employee relation-
ship. The district court ' and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals'
in Maxey noted that by following industry custom, the defendant
Freightliner Corporation had exercised some care. Using the broad-
er Cocke test, however, the courts could have justified finding that
the defendant was grossly negligent and thus liable for exemplary
damages to the plaintiffs.
Another implicit distinction in the most recent cases that apply
the two definitions is that where a death results the courts have
applied the narrow Bradley definition for gross negligence,'" while
the courts, in cases that do not involve a death, have used the
broader Cocke definition." The Texas Constitution only allows for
exemplary damages if a homicide results."' In its initial opinion
in Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc. v. Anderson,"' the Texas
Supreme Court applied the narrow Bradley test,"" relying on
Sheffield Division, Armco Steel v. Jones."' Sheffield involved the
death of an employee; Atlas involved water pollution. The court
in Atlas initially found no gross negligence, but, upon rehearing,
changed its position and held the defendant grossly negligent, de-
See International & Great N. Ry. v. Cocke, 64 Tex. 151 (1885).
15 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
153 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980).
154 Id.; Hernandez v. Smith, 552 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1967); Sheffield Div.,
Armco Steel v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964).
"' Knabe v. National Supply Div. of Armco Steel, 592 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.
1979); Atlas Chemical Indus., Inc. v. Anderson, 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975).
15 TEx. CONSr., art XVI, S 26. See note 4 supra.
157 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975).
M Id. at 687-88.
15 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964).
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spite the fact that the defendant had exercised some care. '" The
court did not cite cases for its authority to do this, nor did it explain
how it could award exemplary damages absent a homicide, as re-
quired by the Texas Constitution. 1' A few years later, in another
non-homicide situation, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Knabe
v. National Supply Division of Armco Steel' relied exclusively on
Atlas."' There the court found gross negligence despite the exer-
cise of some care by the defendant.1' The court in Knabe, like
the Atlas court, made no mention of the Texas Constitution and
its requirement of a homicide in awarding exemplary damages.
If the presence or absence of a homicide is the distinction the
courts are making when applying the two definitions of gross
negligence, the court in Maxey was correct in using the narrow
Bradley definition of gross negligence since there was a death in-
volved. The district court1" and the Fifth Circuit.6 recognized that
the defendant had exercised "slight care." In applying the narrow
Bradley test, the courts found this precluded an award of exemplary
damages.
CONCLUSION
Strict liability in tort arose because of the difficulties plaintiffs
encountered under negligence and breach of warranty theories in
bringing a products liability cause of action." Strict liability is the
easiest of the three theories under which to bring a suit since the
doctrine allows recovery in situations where recovery would be
denied under a negligence or breach of warranty theory."' Courts
in Texas allow plaintiffs to recover punitive damages in cases
160 524 S.W.2d at 688-89.
'!TEX. CONST., art. XVI, § 26.
162 592 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1979). See notes 101-05 supra, and accompanying
text.
13 592 F.2d at 845, 846.
164 Id. at 844.
115 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
16 0623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980).
167 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal, Rptr. 697 (1933). See notes 36-39 supra, and accompanying text.
168 Recovery is allowed despite the fact that the seller has exercised all possible
care and that the consumer has not entered into a contract with the seller. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See notes 16-35 supra, and
accompanying text.
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based upon strict liability in tort,'"' provided that the plaintiff show
that defendant's behavior constituted "gross neglect.''. The narrow
Bradley definition for gross negligence is inconsistent with the
rationale behind courts allowing use of the theory of strict liability
in tort, because this definition makes it more difficult for plaintiff
to recover exemplary damages.
The broader Cocke definition for gross negligence allows re-
covery of exemplary damages in more cases, which goes along with
the idea behind strict liability in tort. Therefore, if the courts are
trying to promote a plaintiff's position by allowing a theory of
strict liability in tort, they should not undercut this by allowing
the defendant to exercise slight care and escape punitive damages.
By abolishing the "entire want of care" test, the courts would pro-
mote safety among defendants due to the threat of punitive dam-
ages. This would, consequentially, provide an incentive for the
members of an industry to improve their products.
Furthermore, assuming that the courts are justified in awarding
exemplary damages in cases in which a death is not involved, it
would seem that a greater degree of care should be required for
the defendant to avoid exemplary damages in those cases in which
a death results. The protection of a person's life should be of the
utmost importance to a manufacturer/designer of a product. To
accomplish this, courts should use the broader "slight care" test
for gross negligence, which would allow recovery of exemplary
damages by plaintiffs in a number of instances.
In applying the two definitions of gross negligence in determin-
ing if exemplary damages are warranted, Texas courts have rarely
attempted to explain the bases of their holdings."' As long as the
courts continue to state a definition without a complete explana-
tion for doing so, the decisions will appear arbitrary and lack
uniformity.1 ' This will lead to further confusion in the case law
"' Newding v. Kroger, 554 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1977, no writ); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
170 TEX. CONST. art. XVI, S 26.
171 See, e.g., Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980); Atlas
Chemical Indus., Inc. v. Anderson, 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975).
1' See, e.g., Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980); Knabe
v. National Supply Div. of Armco Steel, 592 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1979); Atlas
Chemical Indus., Inc. v. Anderson, 504 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975); Sheffield Div.,
Armco Steel v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964).
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and uncertainty among potential defendants who seek to conform
their actions to that law. Manufacturer/designers will not know
whether the exercise of "slight care" will protect them from puni-
tive damages or whether they must exercise greater care in certain
situations. The courts should articulate the policy behind their
decisions when they employ a definition for gross negligence. This
will lead to more consistency and less confusion in future decisions
involving this problem.
Michael L. Knapek
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT-IMPLIED PRIVATE REMEDY UN-
DER FEDERAL REGULATORY STATUTE-Charter Air Travelers Dam-
aged by a Bank's Violation of the Civil Aeronautics Board Regu-
lations Governing Charter Security Arrangements Have an Implied
Private Cause of Action against the Bank under Section 401 (n) (2)
of the Federal Aviation Act. Bratton v. Shiffrin, 15 Av. L. REP.
(CCH) 18,076 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3526
(U.S. Jan. 26, 1981) (No. 80-146).
On October 19, 1976, Tour Travel Enterprises (TTE), a tour
wholesaler, was adjudicated bankrupt.' As a result, nearly one
thousand travelers sought refunds for their cancelled pre-paid
tours. The First National Bank of Highland Park, Illinois (Bank)
was to maintain tour customer deposits in an escrow account pur-
suant to a surety trust agreement between the Bank and TTE.' In
accordance with Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulations gov-
erning charter security arrangements," the tour customers applied
to the Bank for refunds.! Although over $740,000 was claimed by
'In re Tour Travel Enterprises, Inc., No. 76 B 8014 (N.D. Ill. 1976). TTE's
Illinois retail affiliate was adjudged bankrupt the same day, In re Sunshine Travel
Agency, Inc., No. 76 B 8015 (N.D. Ill. 1976), and its Nevada retail affiliate
suffered the same fate one week later. In re Sunshine Travel of Nevada, Inc.,
No. 76 B 8075 (N.D. 111. 1976).
2 14 C.F.R. § 378.16 (1980) requires that a tour operator furnish either a
large surety bond or a smaller bond coupled with an escrow agreement entered
into with a federally-insured bank.
'14 C.F.R. § 378 (1980).
414 C.F.R. §§ 378.16(b)(2)(iv) and 378a.31(b)(2)(iv) (1980). Under
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the customers, the escrow account was found to contain only
$391,000.6
The disappointed tour participants brought suit against the Bank
and its vice-president, Joel Shiffrin, alleging violation of the CAB
regulations dealing with escrow accounts for tour deposits,' as well
as breach of the escrow and surety trust agreements.! The district
court dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted' on the grounds that the express private remedy pro-
vided in section 1007(a) of the Federal Aviation Act9 (Act)
was inapplicable" and that no private remedy can be implied under
section 401 (n) (2) of the Act." The Seventh Circuit Court of
these CAB regulations, if a tour is cancelled the depository bank is to make
refunds directly to the tour participants. Id.
5 It is not clear what happened to the missing $349,000. All discovery was
stayed pending disposition of defendants' motion to dismiss.
"Specifically, plaintiffs alleged improper disbursements by the Bank in viola-
tion of 14 C.F.R. §§ 378.16(b)(2)(ix) and 378a.31(b)(2)(ix) (1980). The
former section provides:
Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2)(ii), (iii), (iv), (v), and
(viii) of this section, the bank shall not pay out any funds from
the account prior to two banking days after completion of each
tour, when the balance in the account shall be paid to the tour
operator or foreign tour operator, upon certification of the comple-
tion date by the direct air carrier.
Section 378a.31(b)(2)(ix) employs essentially identical language with respect to
one-stop inclusive tour charters.
Bratton v. Shriffrin, 585 F.2d 223, 227 (7th Cir. 1978).
8440 F. Supp. 1257, 1276 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
'49 U.S.C. § 1487(a) (1976). This section of the Act was amended and
reenacted in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705
(1978) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1362 (Supp. 11 1978)) to enable the Board to
provide security arrangements for scheduled as well as charter carriers.
10 The Seventh Circuit subsequently upheld the district court's finding that
private persons are limited under section 1487 to suits for violations of section
1371(a) which provides, in essence, that no air carrier may operate without
CAB certification. Both tribunals concluded that a private cause of action is
available under this section only for violation of certification requirements and
that a depository bank cannot be included within the definition of "air carrier."
585 F.2d 223, 228 (7th Cir. 1978); 440 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
"1440 F. Supp. 1257, 1261-65 (N.D. Ill. 1977). Section 401(n)(2) of the
Act is codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1371(n)(2) (1976):
In order to protect travelers and shippers by aircraft operated by
supplemental air carriers, the Board may require any supplemental
air carrier to file a performance bond or equivalent security ar-
rangement, in such amount and upon such terms as the Board
shall prescribe, to be conditioned upon such supplemental air car-
rier's making appropriate compensation to such travelers and ship-
pers, as prescribed by the Board, for failure on the part of such
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Appeals reversed, holding that an implied cause of action exists
under the latter section.3 On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court
vacated that decision and remanded the case to the court of ap-
peals13 for reconsideration in light of the recent Supreme Court
decision in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington" Held, reaffirmed:
Charter air travelers damaged by a bank's violation of the Civil
Aeronautics Board regulations governing charter security arrange-
ments have an implied private cause of action against the bank
under section 401 (n) (2) of the Federal Aviation Act. Bratton v.
Shiffrin, 15 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 18,076 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3526, (U.S. Jan. 26, 1981) (No. 80-146).
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLICATION
A. 1916-1974
The doctrine of implication recognizes an individual's right to a
remedy when he has been damaged by the violation of a statute
which does not expressly provide a private remedy. Although the
doctrine has roots reaching back into English common law," no
federal court in the United States addressed the question of implica-
tion until 1916. In that year, the Supreme Court decided Texas &
Pacific Railway v. Rigsby," which allowed a railroad employee to
recover for personal injuries sustained as a result of his employer's
violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act.1 The Court rea-
soned, "[D]isregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful
act, and where it results in damage to one of the class for whose
carrier to perform air transportation services in accordance with
agreements therefor.
This provision was amended by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L.
95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978), to make it applicable to scheduled as well as
chartered transportation and is now codified at 49 U.S.C.A. S 1371(q) (2) (West
Supp. 1980).
12 Bratton v. Shiffrin, 585 F.2d 223, 228 (7th Cir. 1978).
13443 U.S. 903 (1980).
14442 U.S. 560 (1979).
The doctrine stems from the ancient maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium-"where
there is a right, there is a remedy." McMahon & Rodos, Judicial Implication of
Private Causes of Action: Reappraisal and Retrenchment, 80 DICK. L. REv. 167
(1976) [hereinafter cited as McMahon & Rodos].
16241 U.S. 33 (1916).
17 Act of March 2, 1893, ch. 196, § 8, 27 Stat. 531, as amended by Act of
March 2, 1903, ch. 976, 32 Stat. 943, as amended by Act of April 14, 1910, ch.
160, 36 Stat. 298.
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especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the
damages from the party in default is implied. . .. "
Although the doctrine was seldom invoked during the ensuing
forty years, it gained wide acceptance during the 1960's and early
1970's." A tool of judicial activism, the implied private remedy
was used by the Warren Court to provide remedies for violations
of a broad range of regulatory legislation." Securities regulation
became the most active arena for implication, but the doctrine
found application in the areas of voting rights, civil rights in
housing, labor-management relations, welfare rights, and a host
of other areas.'
Parallel developments occurred in aviation law. Although the
Federal Aviation Act2 does not authorize express private causes
of action, some courts have held that aviation safety is a subject
of compelling national interest which should not be left to the
states." In Fitzgerald v. Pan American Airways,' the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals granted a private remedy for racial discrimi-
nation under section 1374(b) of the Federal Aviation Act." In a
8 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916). This later evolved into the especial benefit test,
the concept that plaintiff must be a member of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted in order to sue for its violation, and became the
first of the four elements of the Cort test. See text accompanying note 58 infra.
"See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389
U.S. 191 (1967); Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S.
84 (1962).
20See McMahon & Rodos, supra note 15, at 176.
" See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964) (securities regulation). See also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
397 (1970) (welfare rights); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229
(1969) (civil rights in housing); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544
(1969) (voting rights); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines,
Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963) (labor relations). See generally Mowe, Federal Statutes
and Implied Private Actions, 55 ORE. L. REV. 3 (1976).
249 U.S.C. §§ 1302-1542 (1976) (amended 1978).
' See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624,
639, 644 (1973); Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 402 (7th Cir.
1974); In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 747 (C.D.
Cal. 1975). But see Moungey v. Brandt, 250 F. Supp. 445, 451 (W.D. Wis.
1966). See generally Crawford & Schneider, The Implied Private Cause of Action
and the Federal Aviation Act: A Practical Application of Cort v. Ash, 23 VILL.
L. REV. 657 (1978) (suggesting that administrative remedies should be sufficient).
- 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956). See also United States v. City of Montgomery,
201 F. Supp. 590 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
2229 F.2d at 501. Section 1374(b) of the Act was codified at 49 U.S.C.
1374(b) (1976) (amended 1978).
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series of "bumping" cases," overbooking was held to be a sufficient
basis for the creation of an implied remedy." Violations of both
the safety provisions of the Act and safety regulations promulgated
thereunder were also held to support implication." Decisions were
far from consistent in these three areas, however," and attempts
to sustain a cause of action under other sections of the Act were
uniformly unsuccessful."
During this period, three tests evolved for use in determining
whether a private remedy is to be implied. The first was the especial
benefit test of Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby." The second test
required a finding that implication would further the purpose of
the statute.' In this context, the courts looked to the legislative his-
tory for any indication of congressional intent to create or deny a
"Bumping" results from air carriers' practice of calculated overbooking in
an attempt to compensate for booked but unoccupied seats. Under this system,
an occasional passenger with a confirmed reservation cannot be accommodated.
Campbell, Airlines' Responsibilities to Passengers: Recent Theories and Exten-
sions, 43 J. AIR L. & CoM. 289, 291 (1977).
21 Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976); Mortimer v. Delta Airlines, 302
F. Supp. 276, 278 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F.
Supp. 360, 364-65 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
"
8 See, e.g., In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 339 F. Supp. 732, 748
(C.D. Cal. 1975); Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612, 615 (C.D. Cal.
1972); Town of East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, 282 F. Supp. 507, 513 (D.
Conn. 1968).
' In the field of air safety, for example, compare In re Paris Air Crash of
March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 748 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (private cause of ac-
tion against manufacturer arising from deaths in allegedly unsafe plane); Gabel
v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612, 615 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (private wrong-
ful death action implied where death resulted from safety violations); and Town
of East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, 182 F. Supp. 507, 513 (D. Conn. 1968) (im-
plied private remedy for nuisance and trespass arising from safety violations)
with Rosdale v. Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681, 687 (D. Colo. 1969)
(no federal cause of action for tort liability under S 101(26) of Act); Moungey
v. Brandt, 250 F. Supp. 445, 450-53 (W.D. Wis. 1966) (no remedy implied
from safety provisions) and Porter v. Southeastern Aviation, Inc., 191 F. Supp.
42, 43 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) (no wrongful death action implied under Act).
3°See, e.g., Danna v. Air France, 463 F.2d 407, 412 (2d Cir. 1972) (no
cause of action under 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) for alleged youth fare discrimina-
tion); Yelenik v. Worley, 284 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Va. 1968) (no private remedy
for damages due to personal injury under section 1 of Act).
31241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916). See notes 16-18 supra, and accompanying text.
I See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964); Hewitt-Robins,
Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84, 89 (1962). See generally Note,
The Decline of the Implied Private Cause of Action, Continued: The Third Cir-
cuit Construes the Federal Aviation Act, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 41, 45-47 (1978).
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private cause of action." The third test focused on whether the
express remedies contained in the statute were sufficient to accom-
plish the legislative purpose.' In applying this test, courts examined
the resources and determination of the agency charged with en-
forcement of the statute to see if they were adequate to protect the
interests of the benefited class.' Throughout this period, no con-
sistent analytical framework was employed in implication cases;
rather, the courts selected the test which seemed most appropriate
to the particular case at bar.3 ' Decisions were correspondingly in-
consistent,"' although the trend seemed to be increasingly in the
direction of granting a remedy."
Decisions during this era focused less on explicit indications of
legislative intent to create a cause of action than on the underlying
congressional policy reflected by the statute in question. Thus, the
Court in Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United State? looked
to the legislative history to determine whether Congress intended
to preclude implication rather than to find some positive intention
to create a private remedy.' In the evaluation of whether the remedy
sought is consistent with the legislative scheme, the use of a more
lenient standard can be discerned.'1 Rather than applying a standard
m The Court's growing willingness to find an intent to provide a remedy can
be traced by comparing T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959)
(whether legislative history would support implication) with Hewitt-Robins, Inc.
v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962) (whether implication would
be consistent with congressional purposes). See McMahon & Rodos, supra note
15, at 174.
34See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202
(1967); Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108, 112 (9th Cir. 1974). See
generally Note, The Decline of the Implied Private Cause of Action, Continued:
The Third Circuit Construes the Federal Aviation Act, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 41,
46-47 (1978).
'See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964), in which the Court
found that private enforcement of proxy rules provided a "necessary supplement"
to SEC action, given time constraints on agency examination of proxy materials.
3'Note, The Decline of the Implied Private Cause of Action, Continued: The
Third Circuit Construes the Federal Aviation Act, 31 RUTGERS L. REv. 41, 46-47
(1978).
31 See note 29 supra, and cases cited therein.
38 See generally McMahon & Rodos, supra note 15, at 169-70.
- 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (cause of action implied under section 15 of Rivers
and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1976), prohibiting abandonment of any vessel
in navigable channel by its owner).
4o 389 U.S. at 200. By framing its inquiry in this way, the Court significantly
eased plaintiff's burden.
41 See McMahon & Rodos, supra note 15, at 172-76.
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of strict necessity, one Court granted a remedy when the plaintiff
was able to show that the effectiveness of the statute would be
"severely hampered" absent private enforcement. ' Still another
Court found a private cause of action on the basis that private
enforcement would be a "helpful supplement" to the statutory
scheme.' In this context, the extent of limitations on agency en-
forcement was deemed an important criterion in the decision to
imply a cause of action." The Wyandotte Court implied a private
cause of action because it concluded that the express civil remedy
provided was inadequate to ensure the statute's effectiveness. '
Likewise, the Court in Allen v. State Board of Elections ' conclud-
ed that reliance solely on enforcement by the Attorney General
would prevent achievement of the goal of the Voting Rights Act."
Throughout this era the Court's philosophy, as expressed by the
opinion in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak," was that "it is the duty of the
courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make
effective the congressional purpose." 9
B. The Burger Court's Approach
Signs of a change in the Court's expansive approach appeared in
the 1974 decision in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Na-
tional Association of Railroad Passengers (Amtrak) ." In a suit to
enjoin the termination of certain passenger rail service, the plain-
tiffs alleged a violation of the Rail Passenger Act of 1970.1 The
I Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 (1969) (private cause
of action recognized to challenge state compliance with section 5 of Voting Rights
Act, 41 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976)).
43J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
"McMahon & Rodos, supra note 15, at 175.
5 389 U.S. at 202. The 1899 statute provided for a maximum $2,500 fine and
one year imprisonment. 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1976).
I Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (private cause of
action recognized to challenge state compliance with section 5 of Voting Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976)).
17 393 U.S. at 556.
0 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (private remedy implied
under section 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976),
based on allegedly false and misleading proxy statement).
45377 U.S. at 433 (1964).
'°414 U.S. 453 passim (1974). The Amtrak principles were reaffirmed in
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 419-20 (1974).
5145 U.S.C. §§ 501-645 (1976).
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Court denied relief, however, applying the maxim expressio unius
est exclusio alterius (expressio unius) . Maintaining that the in-
quiry should be whether Congress provided a remedy, the Court
held that the existence of an enforcement mechanism within the
statute suggests that no additional methods of enforcement were
contemplated by Congress." The Court modified the maxim slightly,
however, averring that its application must yield to "clear contrary
evidence of legislative intent."' This approach marked a sharp de-
parture from the Court's previous willingness to imply private
remedies and presented the lower courts with two conflicting but
equally viable lines of precedent for implication cases."
A year later, the Court attempted to bring some consistency to
implication analysis by formulating a definitive standard. In Cort v.
Ash," a stockholder brought a derivative action against the direc-
tors of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation. The suit was based on
alleged violations of section 610 of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971.Y Refusing to imply a private cause of action, the
Court set forth four factors relevant to the inquiry regarding im-
plication: (1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there is any
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to create such
a remedy or to deny one; (3) whether it is consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a
remedy; and (4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally
*' 414 U.S. at 464-65. "The expression of one thing is the exclusion of an-
other." BLACK'S LAw DICTMONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979). Many commentators have
criticized the application of this maxim, arguing that it purports to discover
legislative intent where Congress may not have considered the question. See, e.g.,
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); Gamm & Eisberg,
The Implied Rights Doctrine, 41 U. Mo. KAN. CTY L. REv. 292, 300-01 (1972);
Note, Private Rights of Action for Damages Under Section 13(d), 32 STAN. L.
REV. 581 (1980).
53 414 U.S. at 458.
54 Id.
Compare National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. 453 (1974) with J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) and
Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 399 U.S. 191 (1967).
-422 U.S. 66 (1975).
51 Id. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 610,
86 Stat. 3, repealed in 1976 and reenacted as 2 U.S.C. S 441(B) (1976), pro-
vided criminal penalties for corporations which made contributions or expendi-
tures in connection with certain federal elections.
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relegated to state law so that it would be inappropriate to infer
a cause of action based solely on federal law."
The Cort test soon proved to be a malleable one. Lacking guid-
ance as to the relative weight to be given to each of the four factors
and having no indication as to whether all four must be satisfied in
order to justify implication, the lower courts found little difficulty
in emphasizing the factors which seemed appropriate to each case."
The apparently equal viability of the Borak-Wyandotte line of
cases!' and that which followed Amtrak" served only to increase
the confusion.
The post-Cort Supreme Court holdings did not follow the strict
standard of Amtrak. In one case, for example, the Court refused
to invoke expressio unius and held that an ambiguous legislative
history did not suggest congressional intent to preclude private ac-
tions." Nevertheless, the Court began to define the third Cort fac-
tor, the consistency of the remedy sought with the legislative
scheme, in the more narrow terms of whether it is necessary to
imply a remedy to effectuate the congressional goals embodied in
the statute." The Court also ruled that a cause of action should be
denied where it is not necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
statute's fundamental purpose, rather than a subsidiary one." Fur-
thermore, it explicitly rejected the principle that implication is
proper to overcome limitations on agency enforcement,"' ruling
that a private cause of action may be granted only if the purposes
"8 422 U.S. 66, 78. The first three factors in the test merely coordinated the
standards which the Court had used in prior cases. The addition, without ex-
planation, of the fourth consideration seemed to reflect the disinclination of the
Burger Court to expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
The Cort factors apply only to statutory implication and are not relevant to
determining the existence of a cause of action under the Constitution. See Davis
v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979).
59 Compare Parsell v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275, 1278 (D.D.C. 1976)
(emphasizing consistency with legislative scheme) with De Jesus Chavez v. LTV
Aerospace Corp., 412 F. Supp. 4, 6 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (stressing special benefit
factor).
6oSee notes 39-49 supra, and accompanying text.
"See notes 50-55 supra, and accompanying text.
0 2Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1977).
13 Id. at 26. For a comparison of this with the standards used earlier, see notes
42-43 supra, and accompanying text.
4 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977).
65 430 U.S. at 41.
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of the statute are likely to be "undermined" or "defeated" absent
private enforcement."
The trend toward a more restrictive application of the implica-
tion doctrine became evident in air law cases as well. In a series
of decisions the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected pleas for
implication under the Federal Aviation Act based on deceptive
practices and violations of tariffs, as well as claims for economic
damages stemming from the alleged violation of safety regulations
promulgated under the statute."7 In other post-Cort aviation cases,
courts generally have followed the lead of the Third Circuit in their
consistent denials of private remedies. 8
II. THE INITIAL BRATTON DECISION
It was against this background of increasing judicial disfavor
toward implication that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals first
considered the Bratton case." The court had little difficulty with the
first of the Cort factors, the especial benefit test." It found that the
statute was enacted "to protect travelers""' against a specific
wrong-the inability to obtain compensation when tour plans col-
lapse; thus it considered plaintiffs to be clearly within the protected
Id. at 25.
6 Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 548 F.2d 452, 458 (3d Cir. 1976)
(no private remedy against manufacturer for aircraft owners required to repair
defective altimeter to conform to FAA directives); Wolf v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 544 F.2d 134, 136-37 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915
(1977) (no cause of action implied for passengers forced to forfeit free guest
accommodations under either S 403(b) or § 411); Polansky v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332, 338 (3d Cir. 1975) (no private action under § 411
of Act for passengers furnished inferior ground accommodations).
8 See, e.g., Mason v. Belieu, 543 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 852 (1976) (no cause of action under antidiscrimination provision for
wife's derivative claim of emotional distress); Sanz v. Renton Aviation, Inc.,
511 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (no congressional intent to create
cause of action in favor of those injured through use of rental aircraft); Viking
Travel, Inc. v. Air France, 462 F. Supp. 28 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (no private remedy
implied for travel agents under § 403(b)); Vandrey v. Lufthansa German Air-
lines, 14 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 17,788 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (passengers denied reduced
ticket charges may not bring federal action under §§ 403(b), 404(a) or 411 of
the Act).
68 Bratton v. Shiffrin, 585 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1978).
70 See note 18 supra, and accompanying text.
"1For full text of section 401(n)(2) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. S 1371(n)(2)
(1976) (amended 1978), see note 11 supra.
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class."2 The defendants argued that section 401 (n) (2) applies only
to "supplemental air carriers"'' and that this section could not,
therefore, form the basis for implication of a cause of action against
the Bank or its vice-president."' The court, however, reasoned that
the use of a depository bank is a necessary element of the regulatory
scheme, and that the Bank is bound by the regulations it agreed
to follow and cannot escape its obligations on the ground that it
was not specifically mentioned in the statute."'
Turning to the second factor, the court found no indication
of legislative intent to create or deny a private remedy, either
in the language of the statute or in its legislative history." De-
fendants contended," relying on Amtrak,' that the express rem-
edies of section 1007(a)"' should preclude implication under sec-
tion 401 (n) (2). The court did not, however, find this argument
dispositive. Noting the interrelationship of the factor of legislative
intent with that of consistency with the legislative scheme, the
Court reasoned that "effectuation of the congressional purpose is
paramount" and that "application of expressio unius in this con-
text would serve only to frustrate the goal of assuring adequate
security for travelers' compensation."'"
72 585 F.2d at 228-29. This ruling was not contested by the defendants in
their initial appeal to the Supreme Court. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit at 6, Shiffrin v. Bratton,
443 U.S. 903 (1979) (mem.).
71 "Supplemental air carriers" are carriers which operate only charter flights.
The CAB has interpreted the Act as authorizing it to permit charters to be
operated by independent tour operators as well as supplemental air carriers.
Such tour operators are also bound by the regulations requiring surety bonds. 14
C.F.R. S 378.16 (1980).




78 414 U.S. 453 (1974). See notes 50-55 supra, and accompanying text.
7 Section 1007(a) of the Act, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1487(a) (1976)
(amended 1978), stated in pertinent part:
If any person violates any provision of this chapter, or any rule,
regulation, requirement or order thereunder, . . . the Board or
Secretary of Transportation, . . .or, in the case of a violation of
section 1514 of this title, the Attorney General, or, in the case of
a violation of section 1371(a) of this title, any party in interest,
may apply to the district court of the United States ... for the en-
forcement of such provision ....
80 585 F.2d at 230. The trial court relied heavily on what it considered the
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Absent any indication of congressional intent, the court main-
tained, the extent of agency enforcement powers must be con-
sidered before deciding whether expressio unius is to apply. Recog-
nizing that practical limitations on agency capabilities do not alone
justify implication,' the court, considering the third prong of the
Cort test, concluded that "when practical limitations are com-
bined with a clear possibility that agency action may never be ade-
quate to remedy the precise wrong which Congress sought to pre-
vent" a federal court must be willing to permit a private remedy."
The court also found the federal court to be the proper forum,
thus satisfying the final Cort test." Although the plaintiffs claims
could be viewed in traditional terms, such as fraud, breach of
contract, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty, the court sug-
gested that the availability of state causes of action should not
preclude a federal remedy." Recognizing that the statute created
the duty, and that the Bank's defenses could be altered under the
regulations by which it agreed to be bound, the court reasoned that
state court action might lead to an inconsistent definition of the
duty in an area in which uniformity is required.' "If the duty of
the depository bank is governed-indeed, created-by federal law,
then the interpretation of the law creating the duty should surely
be undertaken by the federal courts," it concluded."
CAB's authority to sue to compel the Bank to make refunds to the plaintiffs,
citing CAB v. Scottish-American Ass'n, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 883 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
As the Seventh Circuit pointed out, however, there is some authority to the
contrary, 585 F.2d at 231. See Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229
F.2d 499, 502 (2d Cir. 1956); Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp.
360, 364 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
The Bratton court pointed out that in some cases enforcement of the regula-
tions cannot benefit the travelers. This is simply a matter of timing; once tour
customers find the escrow account deficient, it is too late for enforcement of
the regulations to benefit them.
1 585 F.2d at 230, citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41
(1977). See text accompanying notes 65-66 supra.
82 Bratton v. Shiffrin, 585 F.2d 223, 230 (1978).
13 Id. at 232.
84 Id.
I2 1d.
'6 Id. The dissent agreed that the regulations required the bank to assume
certain legal obligations to the tour operator and hence to the tour participants.
It argued, however, that the regulations could not be said to define the obliga-
tions and that plaintiffs' claims should be determined on the basis of principles
of common law contracts and torts. 585 F.2d 223, 233-34 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES
III. THE 1979 IMPLICATION DECISIONS
The first major implication decision of 1979 came in Cannon v.
University of Chicago," in which the plaintiff sought to maintain
an action based on an alleged violation of section 901 (a) of Title
IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972." The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the express remedy (administrative
termination of federal funds) precluded implication of a private
cause of action."
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed." The Court
found that Title IX explicitly confers a benefit on persons who are
discriminated against on the basis of sex.' An examination of the
legislative history convinced the Court that Congress had patterned
Title IX after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which at
the time of the enactment of Title IX had been construed as creat-
ing a private remedy." The Court therefore concluded that Con-
gress, at the time of enactment, had assumed that a private cause
of action would be similarly created under Title IX."
Turning to the third Cort factor, the Court stated:
[A] private remedy should not be implied if it would frustrate the
underlying purpose of the legislative scheme. On the other hand,
when that remedy is necessary or at least helpful to the accomplish-
ment of the statutory purpose, the Court is decidedly receptive to
its implication under the statute.4
The Court found two purposes of Title IX: to avoid the use of
federal funds to support discrimination and to provide individual
citizens effective protection against such practices." It suggested
that while termination of funding is an appropriate means of
87441 U.S. 677 (1979).
88Title IX is codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) and bars discrimination
on the basis of sex in any educational program receiving federal funds.
"Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (1976). This holding
seemed squarely in line with the current trend of the Supreme Court.
"Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
91 441 U.S. at 694.
"1 Id. at 696. See, e.g., Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847,
852 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967); Blackshear Residents Org. v.
Housing Auth., 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
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attaining the first objective, "the award of individual relief to a
private litigant . . . is fully consistent with-and in some cases
even necessary to--the orderly enforcement of the statute.""
Finally, in considering the fourth Cort factor, the Court determined
that a federal remedy is appropriate because of traditional federal
concern with civil rights."'
Cannon shed little additional light on implication analysis. The
Court found no need to weigh the four Cort factors since all of
them supported the same result." The language of the opinion,
however, suggested a significantly more lenient interpretation of
the third factor than had been evident in other post-Cort de-
cisions." Nevertheless, the Court explicitly warned, "When Con-
gress intends private litigants to have a cause of action to support
their statutory rights, the far better course is for it to specify as
much when it creates those rights."1"
Only one month later, in Touche Ross v. Redington," the Court
addressed the question whether customers of securities brokerage
firms have an implied cause of action for damages under section
17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act'" against accountants who
negligently audit financial reports required by the statute.1" Deny-
ing the remedy, the Court stressed that "our task is limited solely
to determining whether Congress intended to create the private
right of action."'" Subsuming the first three Cort factors within
"I Id. at 705-06. Despite its earlier position (in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1, 41 (1977)) that limitations on agency enforcement are not a
relevant factor (see note 65 supra, and accompanying text) the Cannon Court
explicitly took note of "HEW's enforcement capabilities." Id. at 708 n.42.
' Id. at 708-09.
"Id. at 709. The Court's statement that "Title IX presents the atypical
situation in which all of the circumstances that the Court had previously identi-
fied as supportive of an implied remedy are present," id. at 717, may suggest,
however, that all elements of the Cort test must now be satisfied to justify
implication.
See notes 50-54 supra, and accompanying text.
1- 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
101442 U.S. 560 (1979).
1" 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970) was amended to the present 15 U.S.C. S
78a(a) (1) (1976) with no significant change in the relevant language.
103Touche Ross v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 562 (1979).
1"442 U.S. at 568. The Court emphasized that this is a question of statutory
interpretation. At least one commentator questions whether historically any of
the implication cases has been decided on this basis. He stresses the distinction
between statutory interpretation on the one hand and looking to the statutory
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the search for legislative intent, the Court concluded that section
17 (a) was designed to aid SEC enforcement rather than to create
private rights."' The Court reiterated the finding in Cannon that
the mere fact that plaintiffs are among the class of intended bene-
ficiaries does not require implication.' In past implication cases,
the Court pointed out, the statute had either "prohibited certain
conduct or created federal rights in private parties."' Finding the
legislative history silent, the Court warned that "implying a private
right of action on the basis of congressional silence is a hazardous
enterprise at best."' '
The Court found further justification for its refusal to imply a
private cause of action in the fact that section 17(a) is flanked by
provisions that expressly grant private remedies. Without referring
directly to the doctrine of expressio unius, the Court concluded
that "when Congress wished to provide a private damage remedy,
it knew how to do so and did so expressly."'' The Court refused
to extend its analysis to the last two Cort factors; having found
that the statute created no private rights and that the legislative
history was silent, it considered its determination complete.1 '
Touche Ross makes major revisions in the Cort test, stressing
that the central inquiry must be whether Congress intended to
create a private remedy. 1' The Court appears to have modified the
first Cort factor into a two-prong test: the statute must either create
federal rights or prohibit specified conduct."' Touche Ross suggests
that if neither of these elements is present and the legislative history
is silent, judicial consideration of the last two Cort factors is in-
language for evidence of congressional policy on the other. See Comment,
Implied Causes of Action: A Product of Statutory Construction or the Federal
Common Law Power? 51 U. COLO. L. REv. 355, 364-69 (1980).
"'Touche Ross v. Redington, 422 U.S. 560, 569-70 (1979).
0 Id. at 568.
107 Id. at 569.
1w Id. at 571.
109 Id. at 572.
11 Id. at 576.
"See notes 104-10 supra, and accompanying text.
11 Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action under Federal Law, 55 NoTm
DAME LAw. 33, 42-43 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Steinburg]. See notes 106-07
supra, and accompanying text.
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appropriate."' Without overruling Borak... or Wyandotte,"' the
Court makes clear that a much stricter standard exists today." '
The last major implication decision of 1979 came in Trans-
america Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis (Transamerica) ."" This
suit involved a derivative action on behalf of a trust and a class
action on behalf of the trust's shareholders, based on alleged viola-
tions of sections 206 and 215 of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940."' The plaintiffs sought rescission of the contract between the
trust and its adviser, restitution of fees paid under the contract,
injunctive relief, an accounting and damages."' As in Touche Ross,
the Court emphasized that the implication question is one of statu-
tory construction." Looking to the language of the statute, the
Court found a clear intent to benefit the plaintiffs and to impose
enforceable fiduciary obligations on the defendant adviser.' It
pointed out, however, that intent is not necessarily synonymous
with an intent to make available a private cause of action.'
In the language of section 215 voiding contracts made in viola-
tion of the statute, the Court found justification for implying a
cause of action for "the customary legal incidents of voidness."' "
In a five-four decision, however, the Court denied the plaintiffs'
section 206 claim for damages on two grounds. First, it concluded
that "section 206 simply proscribes certain conduct, and does not
in terms create or alter any civil liability.' '. Second, the existence
Is Touche Ross v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979).
14 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See notes 48-49 supra, and accompanying text.
115 389 U.S. 191 (1967). See notes 39-45 supra, and accompanying text.
16 442 U.S. 560, 578.
117 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
18 15 U.S.C. S 80b-6 and S 80b-15 (1976).
1 444 U.S. at 14.
"
0 Id. at 15.
" 'Id. at 17.
122 id. at 18.
12'Id. at 18-19. The customary legal incident of voidness include rescission,
restitution, and injunctive relief.
12 4d. at 19. This may suggest that at least in cases where the legislative his-
tory is silent both elements of the two-prong Touche Ross test (see notes 113-15
supra, and accompanying text) must now be satisfied in order to justify impli-
cation. Clearly, the mere proscription of specified conduct without more was
insufficient to induce the court to consider the last two Cori factors. See 444 U.S.
at 23.
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of administrative remedies for a violation of section 206' and the
provision of express private causes of action in earlier securities
legislation... convinced the Court that Congress did not intend to
provide for private enforcement."
IV. THE SECOND BRATTON DECISION
Within three weeks of the Touche Ross ruling, the Bratton de-
cision was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court for recon-
sideration in light of that opinion." ' On remand, the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier decision, maintaining
that its analysis was consistent with that of Touche Ross and
Cannon.1 ' The court ruled that section 401(n) (2) " "was de-
signed specifically to provide an enforceable remedy to individual
air charter travelers against insolvent tour operators," '' thereby
meeting the "creation of federal rights" tests of Touche Ross.'
Examining the legislative history, which it termed scarce, the court
pointed to testimony before a Senate subcommittee by N. E.
Halaby, then Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency: "By
requiring a supplemental air carrier to furnish a performance bond,
a desirable specific review of the carrier's financial responsibility
will have to be made-and, incidentally, outside of the govern-
ment-and when the bond is issued, some recourse will have been
supplied to those who are otherwise helpless."'33 In this intent to
125 Section 209, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9 (1976), allows the SEC to sue to enjoin
compliance with the statute and section 203, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3, imposes various
administrative sanctions as well.
IwSee, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 11 and 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k and 771;
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9(e), 16(b) and 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e),
78p(b), and 78r.
127 444 U.S. at 19-21.
1 1 Shiffrin v. Bratton, 443 U.S. 903 (1979) (mem.).
129 15 Av. Cas. 18,078 (1980). The court of appeals did not refer to the
later Supreme Court decision in Transamerica Mortgage. See notes 117-27 supra,
and accompanying text.
1"' See note 11 supra.
"1' 15 Av. Cas. 18,076, 18,076-77 (1980).
11
2 Id. See notes 112-13 supra, and accompanying text.
"I d. at 18,077. Senate Hearings on Proposed Amendments to the House
Substitute Amendment to S. 1969, Before the Av. Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm.
on Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (March 5, 1962) (statement of N. E.
Halaby). This testimony was brought to the court's attention for the first time
when the CAB filed a position statement as amicus curiae on remand.
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provide some recourse to travelers in the plaintiffs' situation, the
Seventh Circuit found the congressional intent mandated by Touche
Ross.' Nevertheless, the court reiterated the principle that no
affirmative intent need be shown where the remedy is needed to
effectuate a stated congressional purpose."n It also cited Cannon
for the proposition that "it is not necessary to show an intention to
create a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose to
deny such cause of action would be controlling."'"6
The court further decided that a careful reading of Touche Ross
and Cannon "plainly indicates that more is required to infer that
Congress did not intend to create a particular private right than
one fact that elsewhere in the same statute Congress had explicitly
granted a private cause of action.. 3 Observing that one of the
expressly-created remedies in Touche Ross specifically concerned
false statements in reports and had been enacted contemporaneously
with the section at issue, the court found that sections 1007 and
401 (n) (2) were not created at the same time, nor did Congress
refer to section 1007 when delimiting the scope of the right created
in section 401 (n) (2).' '
In a vigorous dissent, Circuit Judge Bauer questioned the ma-
jority's attempt to distinguish Touche Ross and argued that the
case is dispositive of the issue in Bratton.'3 ' Finding that no federal
rights had been created, Judge Bauer determined that section
401 (n) (2) "seeks to provide protection by a security agreement
independent of CAB remedial measures and, in the event of in-
solvency, to provide recompense to charter air travelers in a state
134 15 Av. CAS. 18,076, 18,077 (1980). Defendants maintained, however, that
the intended "recourse" was a state cause of action on the required bond. See
Petition of Defendants-Appellees for Rehearing and Suggestion For Rehearing
en Banc, Bratton v. Shiffrin, 15 Av. Cas. 18,076 (1980).
"3 15 Av. Cas. 18,077. While on the basis of Touche Ross alone it would
seem doubtful that this proposition is still good law, the court of appeals found
support for its position in Cannon. See note 94 supra, and accompanying text.
136 15 Av. Cas. 18,077, citing 99 S. Ct. at 1956 (emphasis in original).
137 15 Av. Cas. 18,077.
138 Id. The Touche Ross Court, however, has emphasized that the statutory
provision there involved is forward-looking, not retrospective; it seeks to fore-
stall insolvency, not to provide recompense after it has occurred. Touche Ross
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 570-71 (1979). Much the same argument could be
made regarding section 401(n) (2). See notes 9 & 11 supra.
1 15 Av. Cas. 18,078.
CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES
court action on the performance bond contract."'" Pointing out
that Mr. Halaby's testimony" "hardly qualifies as an expression
of legislative intent,"'" Judge Bauer suggested that the Admin-
istrator's comments are equally consistent with a congressional in-
tent to provide recourse through a state court action on a breach
of contract claim rather than a federal statutory cause of action."3
V. CONCLUSION
Since the Cort decision, the Supreme Court has been struggling
with the task of formulating a clear, readily applicable standard
to employ in implication cases. The second Bratton opinion seems
to demonstrate that despite the multitude of private remedy cases
addressed by the Court last term no clear conceptual framework has
yet emerged to guide the lower courts. Indeed, a comparison of the
majority opinion with the dissent in Bratton suggests that the
courts may interpret the recent decisions as a return to two con-
flicting standards from which they are free to choose,'" justifying
an implied remedy by citing the language of Cannon or refusing
to grant one on the basis of Touche Ross.'" Further evidence of
the state of confusion which exists in this area of the law can be
found in the fact that during 1980 at least two other courts of
appeals found implied causes of action under analyses which
seem incompatible with a strict interpretation of Touche Ross and
Transamerica."M
The Court's 1979 implication decisions cast doubt on the con-
tinuing vitality of the Cort test,'" although Cannon deemed the
'4Id. at 18,079.
141 See note 133 supra, and accompanying text.
'"15 Av. Cas. 18,079-80.
'"3Id. at 18,080.
4 See note 55 supra, and accompanying text.
' Compare the reliance of the Bratton majority on Cannon, 15 Av. Cas.
18,076-78 (1980), with the dissent's emphasis on Touche Ross, 15 Av. Cas.
18,078-82 (1980).
'" Curran v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216
(6th Cir. 1980). See National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 616 F.2d
1222 (3d Cir. 1980); Zeffiro v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., [1980] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 5 97,514. But see In re Glynn v. Capeletti Bros., Inc., No.
78-2031, slip op. (5th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th
Cir. 1980).
4
, See Zeffiro v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co. (3d Cir. 1980) [1980] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 5 97,514 (Layton, J., dissenting).
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Cort factors proper indicia of congressional intent."8 Clearly, it
is that intent which is now the central issue in any implication de-
cision."" Touche Ross appears to create a two-part test for deter-
mining legislative intent: (1) whether the language of the statute
creates federal rights in private parties or prohibits any specified
conduct as unlawful ' and (2) whether there is evidence in the
legislative history of congressional intent to provide for private
enforcement.1 ' At a minimum, at least one of these factors now
must be satisfied to justify an examination of the last two Cort
factors; that is, whether the remedy sought is consistent with the
legislative scheme and whether a federal court is the appropriate
forum.' Transamerica, however, indicates that the mere prohibi-
tion of conduct, without more, is insufficient."' Whether the crea-
tion of federal rights alone will justify recognizing a cause of action
without explicit evidence of congressional intent to provide one
is not yet clear. Bratton may suggest that the legislative history used
as evidence of that intent can be tenuous indeed.
The decision in Cannon could be reconciled with Touche Ross
and Transamerica on the basis that a different standard is applic-
able in discrimination cases.'" The Court, however, has not yet
made it clear that it will proceed from that premise. The three
holdings could also be reconciled by inferring that the Court will
now be reluctant to imply private remedies in the field of securi-
ties regulation. 1' This seems to be an inadequate explanation, how-
ever, since the Transamerica Court developed its analysis through
broad discussions of Cort and Cannon, neither of which was a
securities regulation case."" Another possible explanation is that
the present Court is deeply divided on the issue of implication11
148 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1953 (1979).
149 See notes 104-25 supra, and accompanying text.
10 See notes 111-13 supra, and accompanying text.
151 Id.
"See Steinberg, supra note 112, at 42-43.
'1" See note 124 supra, and accompanying text.
"'Such a distinction might well be based on the absence in many cases of a
state court remedy for violation of civil rights.
155 See Underwood, Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis: An
Analysis of the Supreme Court's Definition of an Implied Right of Action, 7
PEPPERDINE L. REv. 533, 550 (1980).
16 Id.
... See Steinberg, supra note 112, at 38.
CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES
and that no clear standard can be formulated at this time. Bratton,
arising as it did completely outside of the areas of securities regu-
lation and discrimination, provided the Court an opportunity to
clarify the implication test. The Court, however, chose not to use
Bratton as a vehicle for this purpose.
Since, under the Constitution, federal courts are not common law
courts of general jurisdiction and can recognize a cause of action
only if it has been created by statute, ' the Court is undeniably
correct that a clear expression of congressional intent should be
dispositive."'5 Implication cases by definition, however, deal with
statutes which do not clearly express that intent. If the Court means
to suggest that clear evidence of legislative intent must exist in
the legislative history, this would seem to preclude any implication
of private remedies. More often than not, the legislative history is
entirely silent.'"0 Moreover, given the nature of the political process,
it seems unrealistic to expect Congress to speak loudly and clearly
whenever :it seeks to implement a policy objective. 1 Congress
cannot legislate in anticipation of all possible situations" and po-
litical considerations often dictate bypassing controversial issues."3
Furthermore, while Congress is now on notice that it must make
its intention clear,1 the Court's position would seem to require
that Congress reevaluate all previously enacted legislation to de-
termine whether private remedies should be provided.'" Barring
such congressional action the courts will continually be confronted
with a silent or ambiguous legislative history.
Bratton, on its facts, presented a strong equitable argument for
implication. Nearly a thousand individuals had been harmed
because the charter security arrangements authorized by statute to
"'Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1974, 1978 (1980).
15 See Steinberg, supra note 112, at 46.
16o Id. at 47.
"'lid. at 41.
"I Note, An Overview of Implied Rights of Action, 40 LA. L. REv. 1011, 1022
(1980). See generally Siegel, The Implication Doctrine and the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (1979).
'16Note, An Overview of Implied Rights of Action, 40 IA. L. REv. 1011,
1023 (1980).
..
4 See note 100 supra, and accompanying text.
16" See Steinberg, supra note 112, at 51.
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protect them did not do so." It may be that the Court's denial
of certiorari was influenced more by the relatively unique factual
situation than by conceptual concerns regarding implication an-
alysis.
Now that certiorari has been denied. ' the impact of Bratton is
difficult to assess. The decision is binding precedent only in the
Seventh Circuit, and it remains to be seen how it will be treated by
the other courts of appeals. The case will probably have little im-
pact outside the field of aviation since the applicable standard for
implication will remain that expressed in Cannon, Touche Ross,
and Transamerica. Within air law, however, it stands in sharp con-
trast to the Third Circuit's anti-implication decisions."8 Given the
unusual facts of Bratton, the decision will probably have only
limited practical effects on the aviation industry. The CAB charter
security regulations appear to be unaffected, but depository banks
are now on notice that a violation of those regulations is actionable
in federal court.
If the Court is in reality distinguishing the securities regulation
cases from the ones dealing with discrimination, Bratton suggests
that the Court is not yet ready to formulate a standard for those
cases that lie in between. This may encourage litigation, especially
in cases where the equities favor the plaintiff. The net result is to
provide no guidance whatsoever to the lower courts in dealing with
these middle-ground cases and to increase the practical problems
of counsel in litigation. The confusion in this area of the law will
persist until the Court promulgates a test that is applicable to a
broad range of cases or distinguishes the types of cases in which
different standards are appropriate.
Eleanor Rotthoff
I" See notes 1-5 supra, and accompanying text.
16749 U.S.L.W. 3531 (Jan. 27, 1981).
"
8 See note 67 supra, and accompanying text.
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